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CHAPTER 4: 
TOWARDS AN ANALYSES OF THE MEGA-POLITICS JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
ECOWAS COMMUNITY COURT OF JUSTICE  
 
OLABISI D. AKINKUGBE* 
 
CITE AS: OLABISI D. AKINKUGBE, Towards an Analyses of the Mega-Political Jurisprudence of the 
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL COURTS, 





Initially established as economic integration enhancing forum with the primary mandate 
of interpreting the community laws and the settlement of economic integration disputes 
between their Member States, the trajectory of most African regional courts has evolved 
in a completely different trajectory from the way they were originally conceptualized. 
The original substantive and personal jurisdiction of most of the regional community 
courts have been expanded from the narrow economic integration fostering and 
settlement of economic disputes aspirations to broad issues that involve the violation of 
human rights with ramifications that have led to disputes with environmental and 
criminal law dimensions. While significant research that illuminates our understanding of 
the partial transformation or expansion of the regional courts to human rights courts now 
exists, there is a gap in the scholarship that engages with the mega-politics jurisprudence 
of these courts.  
 
This chapter critically examines some cases involving mega-politics before the 
ECOWAS Community Court. By analyzing cases that judicialize high profile political 
questions before the regional courts, the Chapter examines to what extent themes or a 
coherent framework for analyzing the judicialization of politics in ECOWAS Community 
Court is emerging. The originality of the chapter inheres not only in its substantive 
analyses of mega-politics, as well as the incorporation of Francophone and Anglophone 
cases, but also, the interdisciplinary approach. It draws on socio-legal analyses that 
foregrounds the Francophone and Anglophone mega-politics cases in the complex social, 
historical, and political national contexts of the Member States. From this perspective, the 
chapter illustrates the motivations of the actors beyond the traditional pursuit of victory in 





* Assistant Professor, Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S., Canada. Ph.D. 
(University of Ottawa); LLM (University of Toronto), LLB (Hons) (University of Lagos, Nigeria), BL 
(Hons) (Nigerian Law School, Abuja); email: olabisi.akinkugbe@dal.ca. Earlier version of this paper was 
presented as “National Impact and Enforcement of Decisions of Africa’s International Courts and African 
Charter Norms” at the “Africa’s International Courts” Authors’ Workshop, April 22-23, 2016, Loyola 
University Chicago School of Law, USA. The author acknowledges the gracious support of the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). 




Since the revision of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) 
establishing treaty in 1993, the cases involving the actual or imminent violation of human 
rights, good governance and democracy in the region have dominated the court’s docket. 
Significant academic research has focused on the question whether the ECOWAS 
Community Court has been partially or fully transformed or expanded as a regional 
human rights court after the order of the European Human Rights Court.1   
 
Although the ECOWAS Community Court lacks express mandate to adjudicate over 
political disputes from its Member States, the court’s docket have nonetheless seen a rise 
in the judicialization of political questions filed by not only individuals and non-
governmental organizations, but also, political parties regarding various aspects of the 
political processes of elections in their countries.  My approach is interdisciplinary. While 
mainstream international legal scholars, political scientists and international relations 
scholarship have all examined compliance, implementation, and effectiveness with the 
decisions of Courts from various perspectives2, socio-legal scholarship provides a unique 
terrain from which this Chapter analyzes the motivations of the litigants in the mega-
politics cases before the ECOWAS Community Court. I argue that the value of the mega-
politics cases should not derive from an a priori analysis of how courts must operate as 
exemplified in the traditional scholarship that focus on effectiveness and compliance with 
their decisions. Rather, the value ascribed to the mega-politics questions that are 
judicialized should before the ECOWAS Community Court derives from the instrumental 
objectives of the litigants. By incorporating the social, political, and economic contexts 
from which the disputes arose, the Chapter also illuminates fundamental misconceptions 
about the role of the ECOWAS Community Court and the judicialization of politics in 
ways that are not wedded to the dominant analyses of the functions of regional economic 
courts. 
 
The judicialization of mega-politics refers to the judicialization of disputes that arise from 
electoral processes of ECOWAS Member States, judicial monitoring of electoral 
procedures, judicialization of good governance narratives, constitutional and electoral 
law amendments, regime changes.3  These emerging category of judicialized political 
	
1  See generally, Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer and Jacqueline McAllister, “A New International 
Human Rights Court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice”, (2013) 108 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 737; Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii and Laurence R. Helfer, “Backlash Against International 
Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences”, (2016) Vol. 27 no. 2, The European 
Journal of International Law, pp. 293-328; Adjolohoun, Horace S, “The ECOWAS Court as a Human 
Rights Promoter? Assessing Five Years' Impact of the Koraou Slavery Judgment”, 2013, Vol.31 (3), 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, pp.342-371; Godwin - A Hart, Sotonye, “Integrating trade and 
human rights in West Africa: an analysis of the ECOWAS experience”, (2012) Vol.32, Windsor Review of 
Legal and Social Issues, June, pp. 57-90; Solomon T. Ebobrah, “Critical Issues in the Human Rights 
Mandate of the ECOWAS Court of Justice”, (2010) Vol 54 No. 1, Journal of African Law, pp. 1-25. 
2 For an analysis of the differences in these concepts, although, in international environmental law context, 
see, Kal Raustiala, “Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation”, (2000) Vol. 32, 
Iss. 3 Case. W. Res. J. Int’l L. pp. 387-440, p. 391-399. 
3 See, Ran Hirschl, “The Judicialization of Politics”, in Robert E. Goodin (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Science, pp. 254-274 (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 257.	
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cases open the boundaries of the ECOWAS Community Court and its imminent 
involvement in the political sphere of its Member States beyond the original substantive 
mandate of the court. The common thread by which these cases are identified in this 
paper is the level of socio-political attention that they generate at the national level, either 
through media publications, preliminary contestations before national courts, the calibre 
of person(s) involved in the dispute or its overall potential outcome for the Member State 
involved. The judicialization of mega-politics before ECOWAS Community Court 
therefore involves instances where the court is invited to decide on watershed political 
questions that face its Member States, despite the fact that the Court’s constituting 
Protocol does not speak to the contested issues directly. It is not entirely clear what 
makes regional courts the most appropriate forum for deciding such purely political with 
significant implications for the Member States.  
 
In Section II, I examine the traditional concepts of compliance and effectiveness. I argue 
that, in their traditional mainstream sense, these concepts are limiting and perhaps too 
narrow for the study of mega-politics jurisprudence before the ECOWAS Community 
Court. In turn, I suggest a broadening of the concepts or a partial reconceptualization of 
them for the study of these cases by taking account of the motivations of the litigants 
before the ECOWAS Community Court as the yardstick for the measurement of the 
mega-politics cases. Taking such an approach allows for the possibility of a broad and 
enriching analyses of these cases that are embedded in the peculiar social, economic and 
political contexts from which they emerge. In other words, compliance, though an 
important aspect of assessing the effectiveness of an institution, but, it is by far not the 
only yardstick. In section III, in addition to regional democracy protocols aimed at 
entrenching good governance, democracy and accountability, I situate the rise in the 
mega-politics cases as intricately linked to democratic wave which began in many 
African States since the 1990s, the perceived or lack of confidence in national judiciaries. 
Battling the tyranny of an incumbent who is determined to remain in office is a very 
difficult task before the national courts. The ECOWAS Community Court therefore 
serves as an alternative forum for the pursuit of justice. To ensure that the court is 
properly seized of jurisdiction, many of the litigants liberally deploy human rights 
language in that they try to fit their grievances under the umbrella of actual or potential 
violation of human rights to freedom of association. Section IV which is divided into two 
sub-sections focuses on the analyses of the mega-politics cases. The analyses of these 
cases are immersed in the national contestations or struggles that gave rise to them as 
well as the direction that they assume in the local media through the different actors.  
Section V focuses on the themes that emerge from the analyses of the cases, to wit; the 
ECOWAS Court as an alternative avenue for contestation of election disputes; reverse or 
embedded victory in lost cases; access – innovative attempts to confer jurisdiction of the 
Court by framing election disputes in human rights language; and incremental, but, 
cautious enhancement of the supranational status of ECOWAS Court. While some of 
these themes dovetail the overall objective of this book, some challenge the extent to 
which we should take these cases seriously. In section VI, I conclude the chapter by 
discussing the implications of this study for future research and operation of the 
ECOWAS Community Court in the context of the mega-politics cases. 
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II. The Mega-Politics Jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Community Court in 
Context  
 
The role of national, regional or international courts can be studied from a variety of 
perspectives that include: law, politics, and sociology. Within each of these fields, are 
also sub-divisions of approaches that one can adopt to illuminate different questions 
about the functions of courts.4 Generally speaking, the dominant approach to the study of 
role of international, regional or national courts derives from the legal formalist school of 
thought. The majority of legal and political science “scholarship tends to view 
[International Courts] in predetermined categories, for example, as transplanted 
institutions that resemble their national counterparts or other [international courts], or on 
the basis of an abstracted hypothesis of institutional behavior or institutional design.”5 A 
cardinal claim of this chapter is that legal formalist approaches6   to the analysis of 
regional courts such as the ECOWAS Community Court are limiting in advancing our 
understanding of the jurisprudence of the court. In its different iterations 7 , they 
investigate how the decisions of these courts have been effective, either based on 
compliance, their impact or influence on the behaviour of the subject of their decisions.8 
An over-emphasis on the causality of compliance and effectiveness can in fact 
“undermine the effectiveness of legal strategies, or how noncompliance can itself be part 
of a successful regulatory strategy.”9 The limitation of such approaches is heightened in 
the context of mega-politics jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Community Court 
undertaken in this chapter because of the strategies that litigants devise as camouflage in 
getting the court to entertain the cases. To adopt a compliance-centric, effectiveness 
oriented or implementation focused approach in analyzing the mega-politics cases would 
only lead to the reproduction of a failure narrative that is devoid of the complex historical 
and contemporary socio-political contexts and domestic politics and power contestations 
within the ECOWAS Member States from which these disputes arise.10  
 
Regional courts in Africa are reflective of and embedded in the socio-political 
contestations of their member states by virtue of the variety of cases that are on their 
	
4 ME Keck and K Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998)  
5 Madsen, Mikael, “Towards a Sociology of International Courts” (October 10, 2013). Oxford Handbook of 
International Adjudication, Karen Alter et al., eds., Oxford University Press, 2014; iCourts Online Working 
Paper, No. 1, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2339903; p 7. 
6 That is, an assessment of the role of a court by the measure of compliance with its decisions 
7 See, Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer and Mikael Rask Madsen, International Court Authority, (Oxford 
University Press, 2018), Chapter 1: “Introduction: Why Study International Court Authority?”, iCourts 
Working Paper Series, No. 112, 2017, (December 2017), pp. 1-31 
8 See, Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, (Oxford University Press, 2014) 
9 See, Kal Raustiala, “Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation”, (2000) Vol. 
32, Iss. 3 Case. W. Res. J. Int’l L. pp. 387-440, p. 412. 
10 See, James Thuo Gathii, “Introduction” [*]. “Similarly, recent works have turned the search light on the 
insights that can be garnered from a sociological perspective on the roles of law and institutions in society. 
For example, see, Mikael R. Madsen, “Sociological Approaches to International Courts” in Oxford 
Handbook of International Adjudication, Karen Alter et al., eds., (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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docket.11 Understanding the mega-political disputes as a category of these cases therefore 
require incorporating in one’s analyses their peculiar historical, socio-political and 
contemporary contexts. A universalist-oriented analysis wedded to a pre-conceived and 
rigid role of courts would miss this important insight of the role of courts based on the 
variety of courts and actors that appear before it. The mega-political decisions of the 
ECOWAS Community Court generate varying impacts, mirror different strategies and 
reflect a diverse range of strategies deployed by the litigants.12 This approach allows the 
adoption of a framework of inquiry that seeks an explanation of the motivations of both 
macro and micro-actors before the ECOWAS Community Court. 
 
A similar, but broader analysis that “assesses how audiences [before international courts] 
respond to the institutions’ [rulings]” is the subject of a forthcoming edited volume by 
Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer and Mikael Rask Madsen. 13  Although, like 
compliance-centric studies, they ask “whether the litigants who have appeared before an 
[International Court] – most of which are states – adhere to its rulings”? However, they 
argue that “the binary of compliance or noncompliance is too rigid a measure of 
[International Court’s] de facto authority.14 The authors distinguish between “de jure” 
and “de facto” authority of the international courts while they develop “a five-level 
metric” that corresponds to different practices and of audiences and the authority of 
international courts.15 To the extent that Alter et al’s framework measures the authority of 
the international courts based on the practices of key audiences before varying 
international courts, contending that a court’s formal legal powers or its legal rulings 
cannot be the sole measurement of its authority, there is an overlap conceptually with the 
analysis in this chapter. 16  Yet, the focus, on the case-study of the mega-political 
jurisprudence of ECOWAS Community Court and the analyses of the court as an 
alternative forum for the mobilization of opposition politics in the West-African sub-
region signifies the originality and contribution of this Chapter in extending the 
boundaries of the scholarship of these Courts.   
 
Actors and litigants approach the ECOWAS Community Court for various purposes. 
While in some cases, the decisions of the Court have been accepted as legally binding, 
yet, in many other instances, consequential actions have not been taken to implement 
these decisions. This inaction, I contend, should not be viewed as a weakness or apparent 
	
11 See, James Thuo Gathii, “Introduction” [*]; Mikael R. Madsen, “Explaining the Power of International 
Courts in Their Context: From Legitimacy to Legitimization” RSCAS Policy Paper (Courts, Social Change 
and Judicial Independence) (2012) 7, 23.  
12 This approach is similar to the work of “interpretive sociology” whose task is “to link habits and motives 
to action, that is to make action intelligible by corresponding action to the agents in terms of specific form 
of “methodological individualism.” See, Mikael, “Towards a Sociology of International Courts”, p. 8; also 
see, S. Hewa, “The Genesis of Max Weber’s ‘Verstehende Soziologie’” (1988) 31 Acta Sociologica 143.  
13  See, Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer and Mikael Rask Madsen, International Court Authority, 
(Oxford University Press, 2018), Chapter 1: “Introduction: Why Study International Court Authority?”, 
iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 112, 2017, (December 2017), pp. 1-31, p. 12. 
14 They argue that most internal courts “possess de facto authority that is partial, variable, and highly 
dependent on a range of different audiences and contexts.” Ibid, pp. 5, 16.  
15 The categories of authority are: “no authority”; “narrow authority”; “intermediate authority”; extensive 
authority; and “popular authority.” See, Ibid, p. 5 
16 Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer and Mikael Rask Madsen, International Court Authority, p 19. 
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disregard for the authority of the ECOWAS Community Court. Rather, it should be 
interpreted as indicating other potential usefulness of these cases. Fundamentally, it is 
important to bear in mind that these disputes, in their original character, were not core 
human rights violations. Litigations have only devised means by which they clothe the 
court with authority to adjudicate over the disputes. From this perspective therefore, it is 
essential that the implementation or lack thereof of the decisions must be analyzed in the 
light of the socio-political contexts at the national level.17   
The contextual analyses of the mega-political cases focus on the practices and 
motivations of the actors by teasing out their interactions with the regional courts based 
primarily on the national disputes that gave rise to them.18 It does not extend to the 
institutional characteristics, legitimacy, authority or nature of international courts broadly 
conceived. 19  Rather, focusing on selected Francophone and Anglophone disputes, I 
explicate other unique ways that the political cases before the ECOWAS Community 
Court are instrumentalized in service of various socio-political agenda at the national 
level. As will be seen, the motivations are not limited to one particular rationale. In 
analyzing these cases therefore, I situate them as embedded in the broader socio-political, 
historical and contemporary contestations in the Member States and tease out the themes 
that emerge at the end. While many of the litigants hope to emerge victorious in their 
claims, they are also aware that implementing the decisions is a challenge. Hence, the 
importance of the mega-politics decisions, should not be found in the black letter law. 
Rather, their value lies in the instrumental roles they play based on their interaction with 
the socio-political contestations in the national context.20 In this regard, even where they 
lose the action, some of the litigants have expressed satisfaction in the deterrent 
capability of such decisions for the future actions of the concerned Member State. The 
mega-political cases represent a fast-growing aspect of the “trade-plus regimes” in 
ECOWAS Community Court.21  
 
 
III.  Reimagining the ECOWAS Community Court as a Forum for the 
Mobilization and Shaping of Member State Opposition Politics 
 
Since the early 1990s, many African states have undergone a democratic-turn from 
military dictatorship that characterized the continent. On the one hand, the democratic-
turn has been celebrated based on the achievement of different milestones of rule of law, 
	
17 See, James Thuo Gathii, “Introduction” [*] 
18 A von Bogdandy and I Venzke, “On the Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of 
Their Burgeoning Public Authority” (2013) 26 Leiden J. Int’l L. 49; also see the very influential work of Y 
Dezalay and BG Garth, Dealing in Virtue. International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a 
Transnational Legal Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
19 See generally, Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, (Oxford University 
Press, 2009); Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Troope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account,  (Cambridge University Press, 2010); Hooghe, L., Bezuijen, J., Derderyan, S., and 
Coman, E., “The Rise OF Supranational Courts in international Organizations”, (2014, Unpublished 
Manuscript); online: https://www3.nd.edu/~ggoertz/grdir/Hooghe_etal2014.pdf; 
20 See, Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer and Mikael Rask Madsen, “How Context Shapes the Authority of 
International Courts”, (2016) 79:1 Law and Contemporary Problems, pp. 1-36.  
21 See, James Thuo Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), p. [*] 
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good governance, accountability and transparency for individual countries. On the other 
hand, the reality for many of the states is that, free and fair elections as an important 
component of democratic governance, has become of the protagonists of internal political 
manoeuvering and contestations among the vying political parties. Speaking of the 
unique trajectory of domestic political conflict in the West-African sub-region, 
Abdoulaye Bathily notes that “apart from the Great Lakes region with the genocide in 
Rwanda, the democratization process has been more turbulent in West Africa than 
anywhere else on the African continent. In fact, over the last twenty years, this sub-region 
has witnessed the longest and bloodiest conflicts.” 22 For example, while it is not 
uncommon for the victorious political party to celebrate the rule of law, the losers often 
point to repressive and oppressive conducts; lack of free and fair elections; restriction or 
outright denial of fundamental human rights to freedom of association as basis upon 
which they seek to challenge the outcome of the elections. In other instances, it is not 
uncommon to have a sitting democratic leader who has blatantly sought to amend the 
constitution to ensure that they remain in office as long as possible.23 Yet, in some cases, 
sitting presidents have simply refused to concede defeat to opposition political parties.24 
These post-elections and associated contestations, provide the significant primary basis 
for the political disputes before the ECOWAS Community Court. The crux of the 
democratic-turn in ECOWAS Member States, is that they are also embedded in a 
complex historical, and ethnic conflicts. With the formation of many of the political 
parties along ethnic lines, some of the political disputes mask perceived marginalization 
or oppression for some ethnic groups.  
 
With waned confidence in the capability of the national courts to deliver justice, 
opposition parties, and affected individuals have turned to the ECOWAS Community 
Court as an important alternative for the adjudication of many of these disputes. Although 
the ECOWAS Community Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain political disputes, the 
question of how these actors have developed strategic ways to bring the cases before the 
court will be examined later in the paper. 
 
The aims of this section are therefore two-fold. First, is to provide a synthesis of the 
“Democracy and Good Governance Protocol”, as the regional normative framework for 
democracy and good governance in the ECOWAS Community.25  Second, I link the 
	
22 Abdoulaye Bathily, “Democracy in West Africa: An Appraisal”, in Building Peace and Democracy in 
West Africa, supra note 1, pp. 23-32, p. 25.  
23 These attempts have taken various modes as will be seen from the empirical analysis of the cases. 
Uganda provides the most recent example of this move by a sitting president. See, Elias Biryabarema, 
“Uganda lawyers seek to quash Museveni ‘president for life’ law”, Reuters, January 15, 2008; online: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-politics/ugandan-lawyers-seek-to-quash-museveni-president-
for-life-law-idUSKBN1F4280  
24 President Yahya Jammeh of Gambia; Laurent Gbagbo [* Provide citations] 
25 See, ECOWAS Protocol on “Democracy and Good Governance, Supplementary to the Protocol relating 
to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security”, Protocol 
A/SP1/12/01, online: 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/350_ECOWAS%20Protocol%20on%20Democr
acy%20and%20Good%20Governance.pdf; see generally, Adejumobi, Said, ‘Democracy and Good 
Governance in Africa: Theoretical and Methodological Issues’, in A. Bujra and S. Adejumobi, eds., 
Breaking Barriers, Creating New Hopes: Democracy, Civil Society and Good Governance in Africa , 
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regionalization of democracy and good governance in ECOWAS Community to broader 
events in the regional26 and domestic polity of the Member States in making the case for a 
re-imagination of the ECOWAS Community Court as a forum for the mobilization of 
opposition politics. The contention is that the rise of the prosecution of mega-political 
cases before the ECOWAS Community Court is the result of the move towards 
enshrining democratic governance at the national level for ECOWAS Member States. 
Litigants before the ECOWAS Community Court therefore see it as an important 
alternative forum that would not stifle their attempts to pursue their claims, as long as 
they can weave-in the trope of human rights violation or potential thereof to allow the 
court to exercise jurisdiction.  
 
Adopted in 2001, the Democracy Protocol enshrines some of the ‘best practices’ that are 
expected in a democratic regime. Article 1 of the Democracy Protocol provides that all 
ECOWAS Member States shall respect the separation of powers, parliamentary 
immunity, the independence of the judiciary, freedom of the bar, and accession of power 
through free, fair and transparent elections among others. It simultaneously prohibits the 
formation of political parties along ethnic, religious or racial considerations; cautions 
against discrimination in the political process on grounds of ethnicity, religion or race; 
while affirming the freedoms of association, and press. Section II which consists of 
Articles 2 to 10 of the Democracy Protocol is dedicated to elections. Article 2 prohibits 
any substantial amendment to electoral laws of member states in the last six months prior 
to the elections without the consent of a majority of political actors. Article 2(2) provides 
that elections shall be organized on the dates or at periods fixed by the constitution or the 
electoral laws of the Member State. Pursuant to Article 2(3) mandates all member states 
to take appropriate measures to ensure gender equality in elections, participation in the 
formulation and implementation of government policies. The provision also guards 
against discrimination against women holding public offices and in the performance of 
public functions at all levels of governance. Article 3 provides for the independence and 
neutrality of electoral bodies of the Member States in order to command the confidence 
of all their political actors. Whereas Article 5 of the Protocol mandates Member States to 
prepare a voters’ list in a transparent and reliable way that builds on the collaboration of 
the political parties and citizens who may require access to them whenever needed; 
	
(2002, Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press).  
26 One of the emerging areas where ECOWAS’s role if growing is that championed by the The ECOWAS 
Network of Electoral Commissions. Although there is no direct link between the cases that were instituted 
before the ECOWAS Community Court and this Commission, as yet, the evolving role is examined as part 
of the wide socio-political context that ECOWAS is embedded and that has contributed to the rise of the 
prosecution of mega-political cases before the ECOWAS Community Court. It representative of the type of 
informal norms within the community with significant potential for formality in the future. To advance the 
Democracy Protocol and ECOWAS’ oversight responsibilities for the electoral processes in the West 
African region, the ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions (ECONEC) support national electoral 
bodies with a view to ensuring the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law as part of the wider 
involvement of ECOWAS in contemporary political relations of the member states. See, Elombah.com, 
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Article 6 provides that the conduct of elections as well as the announcement of the results 
shall be done in a transparent manner. With respect to the settlement of disputes arising 
from elections, Article 7 requires ECOWAS Member States to make adequate 
arrangements to hear and dispose all election petitions. Other than the State, the Protocol 
recognizes the role of civil society organizations in election processes, and therefore, 
requires Member States to engage them in the education and enlightenment of the 
public.27 To guard against autocratic or civilian dictatorship, the Protocol further enjoins 
the party that loses an election to concede defeat to the candidate that is declared the 
winner.28  
 
The provisions of Section III (Election Monitoring and ECOWAS Assistance) of the 
Protocol, in particular, Articles 12-18, complement ECOWAS earlier Protocol relating to 
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and 
Security.29  Pursuant to the provisions of Article 12, ECOWAS may provide election 
assistance in the conduct of any election in any form, including but not limited to the 
dispatch of monitoring team to a Member State country to monitor the elections. The 
Democracy Protocol elaborates on the non-partisan role that the armed forces, the police 
and the security forces should play in the monitoring of elections in Member States.30 
Their roles are limited to the defense of the independence and territorial integrity of the 
relevant Member State and its democratic institutions. As such, they should avoid 
meddling in the electoral processes.31 The situation in The Gambia, illustrated in the 
ensuing sections of this paper, illustrate the value of such a collaborative exercise for the 
protection of democratic institutions and processes and prevention of constitutional crisis 
when championed by ECOWAS.32 Section VII of the Protocol relates to the Rule of Law, 
Human Rights and Good Governance.33 The Protocol acknowledges that “the rule of law 
involves not only the promulgation of good laws that are in conformity with the 
provisions on human rights, but also a good judicial system, a good system of 
administration, and good management of the State apparatus.” 34  Through these 
provisions, ECOWAS Member States commit to the enforcement of the rule of law, 
human rights, justice and good governance. Curiously, the Democracy Protocol offers 
Member States an avenue to withdraw from the protocol upon provision of a one-year 
notice to ECOWAS. Where an ECOWAS Member State abruptly ends democratic 
governance in the State or in the event of a massive violation of human rights, ECOWAS 
is empowered to impose sanctions on the erring State.35 The sanctions, to be determined 
	
27 Art. 8, Democracy Protocol. 
28 Art. 9, Ibid. 
29  See, Art. 11, Democracy Protocol; Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, 10th December, 1999. Online: http://www.zif-
berlin.org/fileadmin/uploads/analyse/dokumente/ECOWAS_Protocol_ConflictPrevention.pdf 
30 See, Section IV: The Role of the Armed Forces, the Police and the Security Forces in a Democracy, 
Articles 19 – 24, Democracy Protocol. 
31 See, Art. 20-24. Democracy Protocol. 
32  Economic Commission for Africa, “Guterres commends ECOWAS for role in Gambia’s peaceful 
transition”, The United Nations, online: http://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/guterres-commends-
ecowas-role-gambia’s-peaceful-transition 
33 See, Section VII: Rule of Law, Human Rights and Good Governance – Articles 32 – 39. 
34 Art. 33(1) Democracy Protocol. 
35 Art. 45(1) ECOWAS Protocol. 
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by ECOWAS’ highest organ, the Authority, may include, refusal to support the 
candidates presented by the Member State concerned for elective posts in international 
organizations; refusal to recognize the State as a potential host for ECOWAS meetings; 
or outright suspension of the Member State concerned from all ECOWAS decision-
making bodies.36 
 
The foundational democratic ideals enshrined in the Democracy Protocol sit in sharp 
contrast to the historical and contemporary practices and reality of the socio-political 
context in which ECOWAS Member States are embedded. For example, the experience 
with authoritarian leadership under former President Jammeh in The Gambia runs into 
tension with the regional aspiration in the Democracy Protocol that all Member States to 
adhere to the principle of separation of powers,.37  Similar points can be made with 
respect to the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol’s charge that political parties should not be 
formed along religious or ethnic lines. 38  The stark reality is that ethnic or tribal 
configurations provide the initial basis for the formation of political parties in many 
African countries. Indeed, based on the popular zoning practice, the emergence of the 
candidates are equally conducted in the shadow of ethnic and tribal representation 
through the rotation of political power. The zoning practice 39  in turn serves as a 
mechanism to mitigate marginalization and peaceful rotation of power among the various 
ethnic groups. For example, with regard to the 2015 Presidential election in Nigeria, 
ethnicity and religion were identified as one of the main drivers of Nigeria politics.40  
 
The gulf between the Democracy Protocol and the socio-political realities of the 
ECOWAS Member States also mirrors the colonial legacies of these countries.41 In this 
regard, the commitment of ECOWAS Member States to the Democracy Protocol 
notwithstanding, the pattern of elections and geo-politics in ECOWAS Member States 
	
36 Art. 45(2) ECOWAS Protocol. 
37  See, Daniel Wegner, “African Democracy on the Rise? The End of Authoritarianism in Gambia”, 
Foreign Affairs Review, February 15, 2017. Online: http://foreignaffairsreview.co.uk/2017/02/african-
democracy-on-the-rise-the-end-of-authoritarianism-in-gambia/; Human Rights Watch, “Gambia: Two 
Decades of Fear and Repression: Disband Paramilitary Groups; Investigative Abuses”, Human Rights 
Watch, September 17, 2015; ______, “State of Fear: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Killings”, September 
16, 2015. Online: https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/16/state-fear/arbitrary-arrests-torture-and-killings   
38 See, B. Salawu and A.O. Hassan, “Ethnic politics and its implications for the survival of democracy in 
Nigeria”, (2011) 3:2 Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research, pp. 28-33; also see, Brandon 
Kendhammer, “Talking ethnic but hearing multi-ethnic: the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria 
and durable multi-ethnic parties in the midst of violence”, (2010) 48:1 Commonwealth & Comparative 
politics, pp. 48-71; Richard Joseph, “Political parties and ideology in Nigeria”, (1978) 5:13 Review of 
African Political Economy, pp. 78-90.  
39 Political zoning is a strategy deployed by politicians to address the marginalization of any particular tribe 
by ensuring power rotation. See, Babajide Olusoji Ololajulo, “’Eating with One Spoon’: Zoning, Power 
Rotation and Political Corruption in Nigeria”, (2016) Volume 17, Issue 1, Journal of African Studies, pp. 
153-169.  
40 See, Udoka Okafor, “Analysis of the Electoral Data in Nigeria’s 2015 Presidential Elections” Huffington 
Post, (studying “the electoral data from the Nigerian election in order to understand the factors that best 
shape our electoral realities and our political landscape.”) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/udoka-
okafor/analysis-of-the-electoral-data-in-nigerias-2015-presidential-elections_b_7038154.html 
41 See, Nic Cheeseman, Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and Struggles for Political Reform, 
(2015: Cambridge University Press). 
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reflect each state’s peculiar complex historical and contemporary contexts. ECOWAS 
Member States have and continue to struggle to conduct free and fair elections. The 
political or governance trajectory of the States has ebbed to and fro between extreme 
military dictatorships, semi-democratic regimes or one-party states, to ‘democratic’ 
governance.  
 
Further, despite the claim to a democratic system of governance, ethos such as the respect 
for the rule of law, freedom of speech and association, independence of the judiciary and 
other fundamental principles that underpin democratic regimes have not taken root in 
many ECOWAS Member States. 42  Hence, the general claim that the states operate 
democratic regimes has done little substantively to change the embedded historical and 
political practices that constrain the conduct of free and fair elections while also clamping 
down on human rights of political dissidents.43 Udombana Nsogurua aptly describes the 
quagmire that despite several years after colonialism, African states “have remained 
colonial in their adherence to generally anti-democratic and repressive measures and 
attitudes.” 44  The repressive and anti-democratic practices of the ECOWAS Member 
States, particularly, as it relates to the political oppositions, make the ECOWAS 
Community Court an attractive alternative in their search for justice. From the analysis in 
the earlier parts of this chapter, it is clear that ECOWAS has had an increasing role in the 
conduct and monitoring of elections in member states.45 
 
To deepen the analysis of the emergence of ECOWAS Community Court as an 
alternative forum for the mobilization of opposition politics, I would briefly examine the 
phenomenon of electioneering in Nigeria as a basis for the ensuing illustration of the 
socio-political context, of the interaction between the national and regional on the one 
hand, and the political contexts that the cases are embedded.46 It is important to caveat 
that the analysis is not intended to present a gloom overall picture or to suggest that the 
Nigerian judiciary is a failure, rather, the nuanced claim is that in election petition 
disputes, the success of the challenges have been more sporadic than the norm. Naturally, 
	
42 See generally, Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente, “Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of 
elections in Sub-Saharan Africa”, (2012) 153:1-2 Public Choice, pp. 117-147. Also see, O’Brien Kaaba, 
“The Challenges of Adjudicating Presidential Election Disputes in Africa: Exploring the Viability of 
Establishing an African Supranational Elections Tribunal”, (June 2015, LLD Thesis), University of South 
Africa.  
43  Said Adejumobi, ‘Elections in Africa: a fading shadow of democracy?’, (2000) 21:1, International 
Political Science Review), pp. 59–73. An example of this case analyzed in the ensuing sections of this 
paper is the Dasuki v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/01/16. 
44 See, Nsongurua J. Udombana, “Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in Africa”, (2003) 24 
Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 1210-1253, p. 1215. 
45 See for example, ECOWAS, “ECOWAS sentizes political parties and stakeholders towards peaceful 
elections in Liberia”, July 19, 2017, online: http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-sensitizes-political-parties-and-
stakeholders-towards-peaceful-elections-in-liberia/   
46 See, James Thuo Gathii, “Introduction”, [*].The introduction to this book describes sub-regional courts 
like ECOWAS as one of a number of alternative forums or pressure points opposition political parties turn 
to in their multi-dimensional struggle against incumbent political parties – this takes away the need to view 
this as cases filed to be won because the strategy is putting pressure on the incumbent party from many 
different angles. 
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many factors contribute to this long-standing challenge. Their examination is beyond the 
purview of this paper.  
 
Adigun Agbaje and Said Adejumobi rightly observe that the institutional weaknesses, 
normlessness, and lack of civility in electoral politics in Nigeria arise from a “complex 
interaction of historical and contemporary forces and structures of the Nigerian state 
system.”47  After many years of military dictatorship, Nigeria, the most economically 
endowed Community member within ECOWAS returned to democratic rule in 1999, the 
country’s Fourth Republic. Previous efforts at building sustainable democratic 
governance were short-lived by military coups.48 Since 1999, Nigeria has conducted five 
(5) presidential and gubernatorial elections with meaningful implications for the 
consolidation and entrenchment of democratic governance in the country.49 For the first 
time in Nigeria’s history, in 2015, an opposition political party won the presidential 
election and successfully ousted a sitting president.50 Despite the modest achievement in 
transitioning from one civilian regime to another, nagging and important questions 
remain of free and fair nature in respect of the legislative and gubernatorial elections.51 
For many of the opposition parties that lost elective positions and who seek to challenge 
the outcomes, “the weak institutionalization of primary institutions in the governance of 
the electoral process … the lack of independence and professionalism, political 
interference, undemocratic attitude, and lack of respect for the rule of law” make the 
ECOWAS Community Court a more attractive forum.52 The foregoing challenges are not 
limited to Nigeria. Between 2015 and 2017, The Gambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, 
Guinea, Niger, Liberia, and Ghana among other ECOWAS Community member states 
also conducted presidential elections that are embedded in intricate and peculiar socio-
political and historical contexts of the individual countries. 
	
47 Adigun Agbaje and Said Adejumobi, “Do Votes Count? The Travails of Electoral Politics in Nigeria”, p. 
27. 
48 The previous republics were: First, 1960-1966; Second, 1979-1983; Third, 1992-1993. See generally, J. 
Shola Omotola, “Elections and Democratic Transition in Nigeria under the Forth Republic” (2010) 109:437 
African Affairs, pp. 535-553. (Arguing that elections in the Fourth Republic are characterized by 
ineffective administration at all stages and levels – before, during and after – resulting in damagingly 
discredited outcomes.), pp. 535-536. 
49 Eghosa E. Osaghae, ‘Democratization in sub-Saharan Africa: faltering prospects, new hopes’, (1999) 
17:1 Journal of Contemporary African Studies, pp. 4–25 
50 See, Associated Press, “Goodluck Jonathan ‘concedes defeat’ in Nigerian election”, New York Post, 
March 31, 2015, online: http://nypost.com/2015/03/31/goodluck-jonathan-concedes-defeat-in-nigerian-
election/; also see, Festus Owete, “Jonathan concedes defeat, congratulates Buhari”, The Premium Times 
Nigeria, March 31, 2015, online: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/180392-jonathan-
concedes-defeat-congratulates-buhari.html  
51 According to Omotola, “allegations of electoral corruption, with the active connivance of INEC and 
probably the transitional military regime, challenged the administration of the election and raise basic 
questions regarding INEC’s independence, impartiality, and accountability … the elections were rigged in 
order to avoid a coalition government and the pitfalls of the First Republic, when no party had enough seats 
to form the government.” Supra, p. 544. Also see, Severus Ifeanyi Odoziobodo, “INEC and the Conduct of 
Elections in Nigeria: An Appraisal of the 2007 General Elections”, (2015) 11:31 European Scientific 
Journal, pp. 168-188. 
52 Omotola, p. 536. Also see, J. Shola Omotola, “From importer to exporter: the changing role of Nigeria in 
promoting democratic values in Africa” in Joelien Pretorius (ed.), African Politics: Beyond the third wave 
of democratisation (Juta Academic Press, Cape Town, 2008), pp. 32–54  
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To summarize, the mega-political cases discussed in this chapter should not be analyzed 
or interpreted distinctly from the broader socio-political contexts of the emergence of 
good governance, democracy and elections at the national levels. The Democracy 
Protocol provides an initial lever for the expanding role of ECOWAS in the 
regionalization of democracy and good governance. As will be seen from the ensuing 
analysis of the case law, litigants in the political disputes before the ECOWAS 
Community Court invoke the provisions of the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol as part of 
the body of legislation in the cases. The disputes emerge out of an integral part of the 
larger phenomenon of fraudulent and rigged electioneering, lack of electoral 
accountability that has plagued many African states.53 With the uncertainty in the form of 
justice that is accessible in the domestic courts that remain the primary locus of litigation, 
the litigants have increasingly turned to the ECOWAS Community Court. However, not 
being conferred with an express mandate to adjudicate over political disputes strictly has 
its own drawbacks for the litigants. The challenges faced by these litigants with respect to 
jurisdiction, as well as the innovative ways by which they overcome them will among 
other issues be discussed in the cases below. 
 
 
IV. Litigating Mega-Political Disputes before the ECOWAS Community Court 
 
In this section I review the political cases that have been adjudicated by the ECOWAS 
Community Court. These disputes, drawn from both Anglophone and Francophone 
ECOWAS Member States, were mostly initiated by opposition political figures or parties, 
based on alleged unconstitutional amendments to the election processes; potential or 
actual violation of human rights in the election process; complete ostracizing from 
participation; or general dissatisfaction with the election results. In the same vein, the 
docket of the ECOWAS Community Court has seen a rise in the number of disputes that 
arose out of electioneering processes in the domestic polity of its Member States.  
 
Prior to the analyses of these cases, two points are worth emphasizing. First, the 
ECOWAS Community Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain political disputes and has 
a matter of fact refused the jurisdiction to entertain disputes that arise out of domestic 
issues that the national courts are properly seized of jurisdiction. An important question 
that the analysis of the cases teases out then is: how have the litigants before the 
ECOWAS Community Court framed these political disputes when they approach the 
Court? Likewise, the analysis tracks how the ECOWAS Community Court has reacted to 
these cases. Second, while the ECOWAS Community Court has denied jurisdiction to 
entertain some cases, in others it has assumed jurisdiction. In this latter category of cases 
analyzed, specific attention is paid to the nature of remedies that the Court declares. 
Perhaps knowing that the regional courts do not operate under the cloud of national 
	
53 André Mbata Mangu, “African civil society and the promotion of the African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance”, (2012) 12 African Human Rights Law Journal, pp. 348-372. (Reflecting “on 
the African Democracy Charter, its significance and also its shortcomings, as well as on the prospects for 
its implementation and the particular role that civil society organizations can and should play in promoting 
the values entrenched therein”, p. 350.) 
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legislative and executive pressures, the plaintiffs in these Courts are emboldened by its 
quick dispensation of justice to seek alternative modes of airing their grievances in an 
alternative court. 
 
The aim is not to track their “impact” or examine in binary language of failure and 
success of “compliance” with the decisions. Indeed, in most cases, events in the domestic 
polity of the Member States have overtaken the cases before the ECOWAS Community. 
It therefore becomes important to understand what is the motivation of the parties who 
continue to litigate before the ECOWAS Community Court in such situations? 
Unpacking these motivations will illuminate and deepen our understanding of the roles of 
the ECOWAS Community Court as a forum for the mobilization of opposition politics in 
ways that traditional concepts of “compliance” and “effectiveness” in relation to the 
mega-political jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Community Court do not capture. The 
case-law analyses are immediately followed by an elaboration of common themes that 
emerge from them. 
 
 
Hope Democratic Party & Alhaji Haruna Yahaya Shaba v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria & 5 Others 54 
 
Hope Democratic Party is a registered political party in Nigeria and Alhaji Haruna 
Yahaya, was the party’s Vice-Presidential candidate in the February 14, 2015 Nigerian 
presidential election. The Plaintiffs contend that the conduct of the 3rd and 4th Defendants 
(respectively Dr. Goodluck Jonathan and the People’s Democratic Party) in receiving 
anonymous monetary donations or gift of any kind in excess of the requirements of the 
Nigerian electoral laws, violated their rights to participate freely and equally on a level 
playing field in government as guaranteed by the Nigerian constitution and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights were violated in the process leading to the 
presidential election.55 The Plaintiffs sought from the ECOWAS Community Court, a 
declaration that the conduct of the 3rd Defendant constituted a form of political 
intimidation, a violation of the laws, and rights of the Plaintiffs. In particular, they argued 
that the actions of the Defendants have subjected the Plaintiffs and their supporters to 
“unimaginable political intimidation/exclusion, psychological trauma, victimization and 
humiliation which affected their participation in the … presidential elections, and right to 
compete in getting their candidates freely elected at that presidential election on equal 
	
54 Hope Democratic Party & Alhaji Haruna Yahaya Shaba vs. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Attorney-
General of the Federation and minister of Justice, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, People’s Democratic Party, 
Independent National Electoral Commission, & Inspector General of Police; Suit No: 
ECW/CCJ/APP/04/2015; Judgment No: ECW/CCJ/JUD/19/15 
55 “In Nigeria, the 1999 constitution (as amended) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria speci ed in section 
225 (1-6) conditions and scrutiny of the sources of funds and expenses of political parties. Section 225 
(3)(a) and (b) as well as 225 (4) forbid political parties from foreign funding of any kind. Section 226 (1-3) 
demands annual reports of account from political parties. By extension, the Electoral Act (2010) stipulates 
the ceiling of expenses by candidates and political parties for specific elective positions. The maximum 
limits are pegged at: N1,000,000,000 (naira) for presidential candidates, N200,000,000 for governorship 
candidates, and N40,000,000 and N20,000,000 respectively for Senate and House of Representatives 
candidates.” See, Adebowale Olorunmola, “Cost of Politics in Nigeria”, Background Paper, Westminister 
Foundation for Democracy, 1-21, p. 1.   
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and level playing grounds.”56 They sought damages in the sum of US$300 Million and 
confiscation by the Court of the presidential campaign fund raised by the Defendants.  
 
On their part, the Defendants denied any wrong doing that limits the freedom of the 
Plaintiffs to participate in the Presidential election or indeed any violation of the laws of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. They therefore contend that the matter should be 
dismissed based on various grounds of law; to wit, the 1st (Federal Republic of Nigeria) 
and 2nd Defendants (Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice) and 6th 
Defendant (Inspector General of Police) submitted that the Community Court lacked the 
jurisdiction to entertain the suit57; for the 4th Defendant (Peoples Democratic Party), that 
the Court should decline jurisdiction to entertain the matter as none of the claims 
submitted by the Plaintiffs came under Article 9 of the Supplementary Protocol of the 
Court. 58  In addition, they argued that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust local remedies 
available under Articles 50 and 56(5) of the African Charter on Human and peoples’ 
Right.59 The Plaintiffs replied that the preliminary objections challenging the jurisdiction 
of the Court were diversionary to the real issues before the court and urged the court to 
dismiss the applications. 
 
To provide some additional context to this dispute, since Nigeria’s return to the Fourth 
Republic in 1999, it was ruled by the People’s Democratic Party, (PDP – the 4th 
Defendant) for the 14 years that followed until 2015 when an opposition party 
overwhelmingly defeated the party in what may be described as the most consequential 
election in Nigeria’s turbulent political history.60 Although, Hope Democratic Party was 
one of the other 13 opposition political parties that fielded presidential candidates in the 
2015 presidential election, the main opposition party was the All Progressives Congress 
(APC). The PDP presidential fund-raising angered opposition politicians and their 
parties.61 Their dissent arose from the fact that while the presidential candidate of the 
PDP was limited to only N1billion campaign cash, it has raised over N20billion.62 While 
	
56 Ibid, p. 9.  
57 Ibid, p 12 
58 Ibid, p. 11 
59 Ibid, pp. 11-12 
60 “For the first time since the inception of Nigeria’s fourth republic, Nigerians had a choice. But more than 
that, their choices expressed in their electoral votes, actually mattered. In this election, Nigerians and the 
world were able to see genuine electoral accountability and transparency at play in the country’s political 
process.” Okafor, “Analysis of the Electoral Data in Nigeria’s 2015 Presidential Elections.” 
61 For example, see, Chikodiri Nwangwu and Olihe Adaeze Ononogbu, “Electoral Laws and Monitoring of 
Campaign Financing during the 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria”, (2016) Vo. 17, Issue 4, Japanese 
Journal of political Science, pp. 614-634; Clifford Ndujihe, Henry Umoru, Dapo Akinrefon & Levinus 
Nwabughiogu, “PDP Presidential Fund-Raising: Presidency, APC bicker over N21BN”, The Vanguard 
Newspapers, December 22, 2014; online: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/12/pdp-presidential-fund-
raising-presidency-apc-bicker-n21bn/; also see, Olalekan Adetayo, “Govs, Businessmen, Others Donate 
N21.27BN to Jonathan”, Sahara Reporters, Dec. 21, 2014; online: 
http://saharareporters.com/2014/12/21/govs-businessmen-others-donate-n2127bn-jonathan  
62 The excessive amount of re-election campaign raised by the incumbent was also the subject of various 
local news media reports. For example, see, Ben Agande, “Naira rain at Jonathan’s re-election fund raiser”, 
Vanguard Newspaper, December 21, 2014, online: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/12/naira-rain-
jonathans-reelection-fund-raiser/; Olalekan Adetayo, “Govs, Businessmen, Others Donate N21,27bn to 
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many argued that the funds raised may have violated the Nigerian Electoral Act 2010 (as 
amended) as well as the provisions of Section 38(2) of the Nigerian Companies and 
Allied Matters Act,63 the first legal challenge was filed by a civil society before the 
Nigerian Federal High Courts. In November 2014, the Socio-Economic Rights and 
Accountability Project (SERAP), made a failed Freedom of Information request of the 
chairmen of PDP and APC to disclose the sources of their campaign funds. Following the 
refusal to make the disclosure, SERAP commenced separate actions against the PDP and 
APC before the Nigerian Federal High Court.64 The foregoing provides the nation socio-
political context that led to the action by the Plaintiff before the ECOWAS Community 
Court.  
 
In deciding the case, the ECOWAS Community Court narrowed the issues to three 
questions.65 The first question was whether or not it has in personam jurisdiction over all 
the Defendants? This was answered in the negative in that while it has jurisdiction over 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria as an ECOWAS Member State and a proper party against 
whom a claim for violation of human rights can be instituted, the 2nd – 6th Defendants are 
not subject to its jurisdiction.66 However, the Court did not find that the 1st Defendant had 
committed any wrong. Hence, it dismissed the action against the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria as being “frivolous, speculative and uncertain, and vague and indistinct.”67  
 
The second question was in relation to the competency of the Plaintiffs to institute the 
action, i.e., whether or not the ECOWAS Community Court has jurisdiction to entertain a 
suit filed by an individual against another individual or against a corporate entity, not a 
Member State of ECOWAS, the court declined jurisdiction to entertain Hope Democratic 
Party (1st Plaintiff) as it is a political organization. In other words, the Court’s jurisdiction 
the respondents argued, was limited to actions brought by individuals for violation of 
their human rights. The next question then was whether the 2nd Plaintiff’s (Alhaji Haruna 
Yahaya Shaba) human rights was violated by the Federal Republic of Nigeria? The Court 
	
Jonathan”, Sahara Reporters, December 21, 2014; http://saharareporters.com/2014/12/21/govs-
businessmen-others-donate-n2127bn-jonathan 
63 Section 38(2) of CAMA provides that: “A company shall not have or exercise power either directly or 
indirectly to make a donation or gift of any of its property or funds to a political party or political 
association or for any political purpose; and if any company, in breach of this subsection makes any 
donation or gift of its property to a political party or political association, or for any political purpose, the 
officers in default and any member who voted for the breach shall be jointly and severally liable to refund 
to the company the sum or value of the donation or gift and in addition, the company and every such officer 
or member shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine equal to the amount or value of the donation or 
gift.” See, Yusuf Alli, Adebisi Onanuga & Bisi Oladele, “N21b donation raises legal issues for PDP, 
Jonathan”, The Nation Newspapers, December 24, 2014; online: http://thenationonlineng.net/n21b-
donation-raises-legal-issues-pdp-jonathan/  
64 The originating summons against the PDP with suit number FHC/CS/1969/2014 and against the APC 
with suit number FHC/CS/1968/2014 were brought pursuant to section 4(a) of the Freedom of Information 
Act, and signed by SERAP Senior Staff Attorney, Olukayode Majekodunmi. See, SERAP Press Release, 
“Nigeria 2015: SERAP drags APC, PDP to court for undisclosed campaign expenses.” Premium Times 
Newspapers, December 21, 2014; online: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/173597-
nigeria-2015-serap-drags-apc-pdp-court-undisclosed-campaign-expenses.html 
65 Ibid, pp. 23-24 
66 Ibid, pp. 24-29. 
67 Ibid, p. 26. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3186627
	
also found in the negative. Consistent with its previous rulings, the ECOWAS 
Community Court noted “… that it will not interfere with matters of enforcement of 
domestic laws of member states.”68 In particular, the court  
 
“declared that it had no jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality or legality of 
acts which come under the domestic norms and laws of the authorities of Member 
States (vis-à-vis violation of provisions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights as raised by the Plaintiffs) and that the Plaintiffs have no locus 
standi to bring the case before the ECOWAS Court of Justice.”69 
 
Finally, in view of the fact that the action had been overtaken by events in Nigeria, the 
ECOWAS Community Court judges posed an interesting question to the Plaintiff 
counsel: whether they would be open to withdrawing the suit – particularly as the PDP 
and former President Goodluck Jonathan lost the election? Refusing to withdraw the suit, 
the Counsel  
 
“… wanted [the Community Court] to rule on the issue so as to serve as a 
deterrent to other would-be violators of the elections law on fairness and equality 
before the law.” [Emphasis mine] 
 
The Court however took a different approach reiterating the fact that it would not waste 
its precious time proceeding on an action that had become devoid of purpose.70 The fact 
that the “Plaintiffs sued individuals and persons not within the competency of [the] 
Court’s personal jurisdiction … [the] court is legally stripped of the right and authority to 
go into the substance of the allegations of the complaint because any action taken by the 
Court without authority/jurisdiction, is legally void, hence, the case has to end at this 
preliminary stage without discussing the merits.”71  
 
It is interesting to note that the Plaintiff Counsel’s response as striking and represents 
perhaps the clearest indication of a motivation of opposition parties in pursing their 
grievances before the ECOWAS Community Court. As indicated in the introduction to 
this Chapter, understanding the mega-political cases before ECOWAS Community Court 
requires the study of the context and the rationale for choosing the court in the first place. 
This case demonstrates that victory was not the aim. With victory out of sight, the 
Plaintiff unequivocally wanted a ruling from the court as a deterrent for future conduct of 
the Member State. At other times, the significance of the mega-political cases lies in the 
instrumental value it serves to further local activism in various guises as well as an 
alternative forum for the mobilization of opposition politics.72  
 
	
68 Ibid, p. 30 
69Quoting Community Court’s previous decision in Center for Democracy and Development and Center for 
Defense of Human Rights vs. Mamadou Tandja and the Republic of Niger [*] 
70 Ibid, pp. 33-34; Mamadou Tandja, Ibid, pp. 118-117 
71 Ibid, p. 35. 
72 I demonstrate this in the context of the analysis of the Burkina Faso case below. Also see, James Thuo 
Gathii, “Introduction”, [*]. 
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Similarly, to ensure that the court was seized of jurisdiction, the parties couched their 
grievance in the language of a violation of human rights. However, as the analyses of the 
national socio-political context reveal, the dispute arose purely as a political grievance. 
Lastly, the ECOWAS Community Court is very strategic in protecting its jurisdiction as 
well as the legitimacy of its decisions. It does so by accepting rather than declining 
jurisdiction in what are essentially political disputes as long as they raised a legal issue 
for determination. Hence, framed as a human rights violation or potential violation of 
case, litigants adopt human rights as an umbrella term to get the cases heard. The 
approach of the Court in this context accords with some general international law 
scholarship of the International Court of Justice in particular.73  As such, despite its 
supranational status, the court would not venture into the domestic realm to prevent a 
conflict of decisions with the national courts of its member states.  
 
Sule Audu & Six Others v. Federal Republic of Nigeria 
 
The context of the gubernatorial elections in Kogi State, Nigeria are critical to 
understanding the emergence of this case before the ECOWAS Community Court. The 
then incumbent governor, Abubakar Audu, was the original aspirant on the platform of 
the All Progressives Congress (APC). His closest challenger was Mr. Idris Wada of the 
People’s Democratic Party – the party that produced the president since 1999 when 
Nigeria returned to civilian regime. Abubakar Audu was on his way to securing victory, 
but, passed on before he could be declared the winner of the elections. The Nigerian 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declared the election as inconclusive 
because the margin of votes between the deceased and his closest challenger did not meet 
the constitutionally required threshold to declare him the winner.74 His death thrust the 
state into a constitutional crisis and a path with no legal or political precedent in 
Nigeria.75  The question however arose as to which of the candidates should be the 
governor-elect. The provisions with that had the closest relevance to address this scenario 
was Section 181 of the Nigerian Constitution of 1999.76  
	
73  See generally, Coleman, Andrew “The ICJ and High Political Matters”, Melbourne Journal of 
International Law (2009). David, Marcella. “Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question 
Doctrine for Application in the World Court”, 40 Harv, 81 (1999). For the cases: Case Concerning the 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 
Merits, Judgement of 27 June, 1986. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran (United States of America v Iran), Judgement of 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports 3. Case Concerning 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) (Provisional 
Measures), Order, 1979 ICJ Reports 7. 
74 The INEC had declared the election inconclusive following the cancellation of the poll in 91 units across 
18 local government areas in the state. See, Hassan Adebayo, “INEC declares Kogi governorship election 
inconclusive”, Premium Times Newspapers, November 22, 2015; online: 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/193724-inec-declares-kogi-governorship-election-
inconclusive.html  
75 See, Ibanga Isine and Sani Tukur, “Kogi Election and Abubakar Audu’s death: What lawyers and the law 
say”, Premium Times Newspapers, November 23, 2015; online: 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/193764-kogi-election-and-abubakar-audus-death-what-lawyers-
and-the-law-say.html  
76 According to Section 181(1) & (2): (1) If a person duly elected as Governor dies before taking and 
subscribing the Oath of Allegiance and oath of office or is unable for any reason whatsoever to be sworn in, 
the person elected with him as Deputy governor shall be sworn in as Governor and he shall nominate a new 
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The challenge was that at the time of his death, Audu Abubakar had not been duly elected 
as required by the provisions of the constitution. INEC, relying on a combined reading of 
the provisions of Section 221 of the Nigerian Constitution and Section 33 of the Nigerian 
Electoral Act,77 asked that the APC replace the gubernatorial candidate ahead of the 
supplementary elections. 78  His erstwhile running-mate – Mr. Faleke Abiodun 79  – 
disagreed with INEC’s position and asked to be declared the governor-elect ahead of the 
supplementary elections. The opposition party (PDP) also asked that their candidate be 
declared the winner of the elections because demanded for the expulsion of the APC from 
the supplementary polls.80 Instead of announcing that the deputy-gubernatorial candidate 
will replace the deceased Audu Abubakar, the APC notified INEC of their appointment 
of Prince Yahaya Bello – the first runner-up of its governorship primaries in the State – 
as the replacement candidate ahead of the supplementary elections fixed for December 5, 
2015.81 While this announcement generated internal squabble within the APC in Kogi 
State, 82  Prince Yahaya Bello remained the party’s candidate with a new deputy-
gubernatorial candidate. Following the supplementary elections, APC emerged as the 
winner of the gubernatorial election in Kogi State. 
   
The foregoing provides the political context in Kogi State, Nigeria, that led to the dispute 
before the ECOWAS Community Court.83 This case was brought by seven registered 
voters in Kogi State who contested the propriety of the process for the election of Prince 
	
Deputy-Governor who shall be appointed by the Governor with the approval of a simple majority of the 
House of Assembly of the State. [Emphasis mine] (2) Where the persons duly elected as Governor and 
Deputy Governor of a State die or are for any reason unable to assume office before the inauguration of the 
house of Assembly, the Independent National Electoral Commission shall immediately conduct an election 
for a Governor and Deputy Governor of the State. 
77 Section 33(Political Parties changing Candidates) provides that: “A political party shall not be allowed to 
change or substitute its candidate whose name has been submitted … except in the case of death or 
withdrawal by the candidate.” See, http://www.parliament.am/library/norelectoral%20law/nigeria.pdf  
78 Hassan Adebayo, “INEC asks APC to replace Audu, orders Kogi election to continue”, Premium Times, 
November 24, 2105; Online: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/193846-inec-asks-apc-to-
replace-audu-orders-kogi-election-to-continue.html 
79 Vanguard Newspaper, “Faleke to INEC: I’m governor-elect of Kogi”, November 26, 2015; Online: 
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/11/faleke-to-inec-im-governor-elect-of-kogi/ 
80  Gbade Ogunwale, “PDP to INEC: Declare Wada as Winner of Kogi Elections”; The National 
Newspaper, November 26, 2015; Online: http://thenationonlineng.net/pdp-to-inec-declare-wada-as-winner-
of-kogi-election/; also see, Emmanuel Aziken, “PDP Kicks as INEC asks APC to replace Audu”, Vanguard 
Newspaper, November 25, 2015; Online: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/11/pdp-kicks-as-inec-asks-
apc-to-replace-audu/ 
81  Omeiza Ajayi, “Kogi: INEC receives APC’s Yahaya Bello as Audu’s replacement”, Vanguard 
Newspaper, November 30, 2015; online: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/11/kogi-inec-receives-apcs-
yahaya-bello-as-audus-replacement/  
82 In particular, Mr. Faleke, the former deputy-gubernatorial refused to continue in this position as Prince 
Yahaya Bello’s deputy. Eventually, he was replaced by the APC. See, Ikechukwu Nnochiri, Levinus 
Nwabughiogu & Omeiza Ajayi, “Kogi: INEC, APC in dilemma as Faleke remains unwilling running 
mate”, Vanguard Nigeria, December 2, 2015; Online: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/12/kogi-inec-
apc-in-dilemma-as-faleke-remains-unwilling-running-mate/ 
83 See, Segun Adebowale, “Kogi Governorship Poll: Voters Drag FG to ECOWAS Court”, The Eagle 
Online, January 12, 2016; online: http://theeagleonline.com.ng/kogi-governorship-poll-voters-drag-fg-to-
ecowas-court/ 
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Yahaya Bello as the governor of Kogi State, Nigeria.84 The case challenged the decision 
of the INEC to declare the candidate of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) the 
winner of the gubernatorial election in the state based on the December 5, 2016 
supplementary election. According to the Plaintiffs, since Yahaya Bello did not 
participate in the earlier election on 21st November 2016, but, only emerged following the 
death of APC’s original candidate, the decision by INEC to declare the replacement 
candidate victorious by integrating the votes cast for the late candidate was irregular. 
They contended that his emergence fell “short of the minimum standard of free, fair, 
transparent, genuine and credible elections which would be the sine qua non for the 
popular participation of the people in the affairs of governance.”85 In particular, they 
submitted that “Bello never campaigned for the elections, except those for his nomination 
within his own party, and that he did not interact with the people on the larger scale of 
those who do not belong to his party. He never presented his manifesto, or agenda in 
terms of his promises and goals and initiatives he would undertake if voted into office. 
The people of Kogi state were never given an opportunity to assess him, size him up or 
verify his personal and political resume.”86 The plaintiffs sought an order compelling the 
Defendant to take constitutional, legal and other necessary measures to “redress the 
aberrations and fundamental rights violations flowing from the governorship election.”87 
The Defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Community Court to 
entertain human rights suit bordering on the 2015 governorship election. They urged the 
Court to dismiss the suit for lack of cause of action. The Plaintiffs’ counsel responded 
that the substantive application before the court was for the human right enforcement and 
as such, the ECOWAS Community Court pursuant to the provisions of Protocol 2005 has 
the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate on complaints of fundamental rights violations that 
occur in any member states.  
 
The ECOWAS Community Court however declined jurisdiction in this case on the basis 
that it arose and related to matter of electoral law which comes under the laws of Member 
States. In addition, being a matter that has been legitimately pursued before the national 
courts in Nigeria, the ECOWAS Community Court in line with its previous decisions will 
not intervene in such a situation. Further, the Community Court rejected the Plaintiffs’ 
claim that the complaint is one of alleged violation of human rights. The cause of action, 
	
84  Hon. Sule Audu, Ikeleji Agada, Labaran I. Dadido, Isaka Isa, Abdul Audu, Aremu Abdullahi and 
Sulaiman Abdul v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/02/16; ECOWAS Press Release, 




86 Segun Adebowale, “Kogi Governorship Poll: Voters Drag FG to ECOWAS Court”, The Eagle Online, 
January 12, 2016; online: http://theeagleonline.com.ng/kogi-governorship-poll-voters-drag-fg-to-ecowas-
court/; also see, Popoola Babalola, “Kogi Poll: Votes belong to Party Not Candidates, Says Witness”, The 
Eagle Online, April 13, 2016, Online: http://theeagleonline.com.ng/kogi-governorship-poll-voters-drag-fg-
to-ecowas-court/ 
87  ECOWAS Press Release, “Court Fixes Date for Ruling on Jurisdiction in Nigeria Election Case”, 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=362:court-fixes-
date-for-ruling-on-jurisdiction-in-nigeria-election-case. Also see, Sunday Ejike, “Kogi guber election: 
ECOWAS court to rule on jurisdiction March 20”, The Nigerian Tribune, online: 
http://tribuneonlineng.com/kogi-guber-election-ecowas-court-rule-jurisdiction-march-20/   
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as filed by the Plaintiffs therefore fell outside the purview of the jurisdiction of the 
ECOWAS Community Court.88 
 
The Plaintiffs’ attempt to circumvent the jurisdiction rules of the ECOWAS Court by 
describing their case as primarily a human rights violation incident failed in this instance. 
However, it is interesting to note that the Plaintiffs did not challenge INEC’s decision 
before the Nigerian national court. Indeed, the Plaintiffs commenced their action despite 
the fact that there was another action before the elections tribunal challenging the 
emergence of the Prince Yahaya Bello as the gubernatorial candidate.89 Although the 
case fits more into the category of dissidents within a political party who see the 
ECOWAS Community Court as an alternative forum, it nonetheless exemplifies the 
complexity of the motivations of the parties that appear before the court. From this point 
of view, simply examining the compliance rate or effectiveness of the decisions of the 
Court at the regional level will not capture these underlying socio-political contexts in the 
national level. 
 
Dr. Jerry Ugokwe vs. The Federal Republic of Nigeria and Dr. Christian Okeke 
(Applicant for Intervention) 
 
Like many of the mega-politics cases, the substantive dispute in this case originated from 
the elections conducted to the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives in 2003.90 
Following a declaration of the Applicant as the winner of the 2003 election by the 
Nigerian Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), one Dr. Christian Okeke 
successfully petitioned against the Applicant’s victory before the Elections Tribunal.91 
The implication of this was the annulment of the Applicant’s election. The Applicant’s 
effort to overturn this decision before the Nigerian Court of Appeal also failed as the 
appellate court affirmed the ruling of the Election Tribunal. 
 
Before the ECOWAS Community Court, the Applicant couched his grievance as an 
infringement of his right to fair hearing by the Governors and House of Representatives 
Tribunal (“Elections Tribunal”) and the Nigerian Court of Appeal.92 He asked the court 
for a special interim Order restraining INEC from invalidating his certificate of 
attestation declaring him a Member of the Nigerian National Assembly, nor grant the said 
certificate to another person; and an order preventing the Federal National Assembly 
from relieving him of his position as an Assembly Member. The Applicant also asked the 
	
88  ECOWAS Press Release, “ECOWAS Court Dismisses Case Concerning Kogi State Governorship 
Election in Nigeria”, See, 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=400:ecowas-
court-dismisses-case-concerning-kogi-state-governorship-election-in-nigeria- 
89 See, Premium Times, “Faleke sues INEC, asks Court to declare him Kogi’s governor-elect”, December 
1, 2015; online:  https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/194238-breaking-faleke-sues-inec-
asks-court-to-declare-him-kogis-governor-elect.html 
90  See, Jerry Ugokwe v. Nigeria, Suit No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/05, online: 
http://dev.ihrda.org/doc/ecw.ccj.jud.03.05/view/ 
91 See Dr. C. C. Okeke v. Independent National Electoral Commission & Others, No. EPT/AN/NA/6/2003 
92See, C.J. Ubanyionwu, “Election Petition Cases and the Right to Fair Trial within a Reasonable Time in 
Nigeria”, pp. 111-123, online: https://www.ajol.info/index.php/naujilj/article/viewFile/136349/125840  
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ECOWAS Court for the following orders: a declaration that the procedures and the 
judgment delivered by the Elections Tribunal and by the Court of Appeal are null and 
void; urge the INEC and the National Assembly not to, respectively, invalidate his 
election as a Member of the National Assembly of Nigeria and for the latter not to 
proceed to replace him with another person.93 The Applicant relied on the combined 
provisions of Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 9(4) and 10(d) of the ECOWAS 
Community Court Supplementary Protocol and Article 36 of the 1999 Constitution of 
Nigeria. The Defendant (Federal Republic of Nigeria) filed a preliminary objection 
relying on two grounds: that the ECOWAS Community Court lacks the jurisdiction to 
entertain election disputes; and that the courts of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are the 
appropriate forum with jurisdiction to entertain electoral disputes. On his part, Dr. 
Christian Okeke, filed an intervener application, and sought to be joined as an interested 
party as he will be affected by the decision of the Court. The intervener also argued that 
the Applicant’s suit was commenced in bad faith and is a strategic attempt at obstructing 
his swearing-in. Similarly, they argued that the ECOWAS Community Court was not 
seized of jurisdiction to adjudicate over election disputes.  
 
Based on the preliminary objections, the ECOWAS Community Court raised the 
following issue: whether electoral disputes are subject to the legal order applicable to the 
community? The applicable laws in ECOWAS Community are: the ECOWAS Treaty, 
Protocols, Conventions and other instruments relating to them. 94  The ECOWAS 
Community Court held that the legal texts applicable confers no general or specific 
power to adjudicate on election disputes or matters arising therefrom. On the other hand, 
notwithstanding that a dispute has political dimensions to it, the determination of the 
other rights of the parties may be referred to the ECOWAS Court of Justice.95 On this 
basis, the court proceeded to examine whether the fundamental right of the Applicant to 
fair hearing was infringed in the course of the hearings before the Election Tribunal and 
the Court of Appeal.96 
 
Based on a comprehensive analysis of the jurisprudence on fair hearing and the 
competence of the Court in relation to violation of human rights, the Court affirmed that 
it had jurisdiction to in cases alleged denial of fair hearing. In this regard, the court posed 
the following question: “does the fact that the Nigerian Courts invalidated the election of 
	
93 Jerry Ugokwe v. Nigeria, par. 14. 
94 For the various legal instruments that are part of the community’s legal order, see generally, Jerry 
Ukuigwe, ECOWAS Community Law, (Springer, 2016) 
95 Jerry Ugokwe v. Nigeria, par. 19. See, Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
See generally, Coleman, Andrew “The ICJ and High Political Matters”, Melbourne Journal of International 
Law (2009). David, Marcella. “Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the Political Question Doctrine for 
Application in the World Court”, 40 Harv, 81 (1999). For the cases: Case Concerning the Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, 
Judgement of 27 June, 1986. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(United States of America v Iran), Judgement of 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports 3. Case Concerning United 
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) (Provisional Measures), 
Order, 1979 ICJ Reports 7. 
96 “… besides the electoral problem, there are grounds for us to ponder, in a second instance, on the 
competence of the Court when the Applicant raises the legal plea on right to fair hearing.” Ibid., par. 21. 
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the Applicant constitute a human right violation?”97  Following a review of the record of 
proceedings from the Election Tribunal and the Court of Appeal, the ECOWAS 
Community Court offered the following succinct statement on the nature of the functions 
and relationship vis-à-vis national courts of its Member States. 
 
“Appealing against the decision of the National Court of Member States does not 
form part of the powers of the Court; the distinctive feature of the Community 
legal order of ECOWAS is that it sets forth a judicial monism of first and last 
resort in Community law. And, if the obligation to implement the decision of the 
Community Court of Justice lies with the national courts of Member States, the 
kind of relationship existing between the Community Court and these national 
courts of Member States are not of a vertical nature between the Community and 
the Member States, but demands an integrated Community legal order. The 
ECOWAS Court of Justice is not a Court of Appeal or a Court of cassation.”98  
 
The court therefore declined jurisdiction to entertain the matter dealing with electoral 
dispute and also found itself incompetent to make pronouncement in relation to the orders 
of violation of the Applicant’s right in the cases before the Election Tribunal and the 
Court of Appeal. Consequent upon the finding that the court was incompetent to 
adjudicate on the complaints in the substantive matter, it also denied the request by the 
intervener to be joined to the suit. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the suit.  
 
This case provides an interesting perspective to the thesis of this chapter that the political 
disputes on the dockets of the ECOWAS Community Court deserve an unconventional 
mode of analysis to understand the motivations of opposition politicians who mobilize 
before the court as an alternative forum and the different ways that the Court addresses 
the jurisdiction issues that they raise both in relation to itself, and vis-à-vis the national 
courts of its Member States. The first point that emerges from this case relates to the 
misconception that Member States do not recognize the authority of the court. In other 
words, framed in conventional language, that the court does not have impact on activities 
in its Member States. At the on-set of this case, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives would have shortly thereafter sworn-in Dr. Okeke, the intervener, who 
successfully challenged the election of the Applicant. However, following a notification 
of the existence of this case to the Attorney-General of Nigeria, he wrote to the Speaker 
not to allow Dr. Christian Okeke into the House of Representatives until the 
determination of the case before the ECOWAS Community Court.99 Although the action 
of the Attorney-General was not carried out pursuant to an order of the court, it is 
indicative of the regard that the Member States, such as Nigeria, have for the authority of 
the Court. While an empirical analysis of the compliance with the final decisions of the 
	
97 Ibid, par 22.  
98 Ibid, par. 32. 
99 Ise-Oluwa Ige, “Nigeria: Olujimi Writes Speaker Not to Accept Man into House”, allAfrica, 23 May 
2005, online: http://allafrica.com/stories/200505230916.html; Also see, Christof Hartmann 2013: 
Governance Transfer by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). A B2 Case Study 
Report, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 47, Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, 
December 2013, pp. 1-56, p. 34. (Investigating how and under which conditions regional organizations 
prescribe and promote standards for (legitimate) governance (institutions) at the national level.)  
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court will not capture instances such as this, it is nevertheless demonstrated the limited-
impact of the ECOWAS Community Court. Secondly, the action of the Attorney-General 
affirms the supranational status of ECOWAS Community Court in respect of the areas 
that it has authority. Although the compliance in this case arose merely from the fact that 
the matter was before the court and that the Member States should not take any step that 
undermines the action, the fact that it was a regional hegemon with significant power 
dynamic within ECOWAS that acted in this manner, it indicates the incremental 
strengthening of the supranational status of the Court. Lastly, although the court declined 
jurisdiction, the case affirms one of the core arguments in this chapter and the book in 
general: that litigants in mega-political disputes view the ECOWAS Community Court as 
a forum for the mobilization of opposition politics. 
 
Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & others vs. The State of Burkina 
Faso 
 
Given the significant domestic power struggles that foreshadowed the institution of this 
case before the ECOWAS Community Court, understanding the ramifications of the case 
therefore requires an initial analysis of the socio-political context that led to its 
emergence. From 2014 to 2015, Burkina Faso faced different levels of domestic political 
maneuvering and contestations. In 2014, former president Blaise Compaoré, who had 
been in power since 1987, and his political party, Congrès pour la Démocratie et le 
Progrès (CDP), were ousted from power.100  The dispute in this case arose out of a 
purported amendment to the electoral laws on the State of Burkina Faso that ousted the 
applicants from participation in future electoral processes in the country. The principal 
question before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice was whether the amendment 
of Burkina Faso’s electoral law, given the way it is applied, violates the right to certain 
political parties and citizens to vote and participate in elections? The Applicants, a group 
of opposition political parties and thirteen (13) individuals, approached the ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice alleging the breach of their fundamental human rights by the 
Transitional team of the State of Burkina Faso. An attempt to amend the constitution by 
the President of Burkina Faso was met with repeated violent demonstrations in October 
2014. Following the death and destruction of several persons as well as public and private 
property, the President resigned, and the proposed amendment also failed. The 
international community and ECOWAS supported a political transition that would 
eventually lead to democratic and transparent elections in Burkina Faso. 
 
The National Forum which brought together the critical interest groups in the Burkinabe 
nation adopted a Political Transition Charter in November 2004, and also set up a 
National Transition Council (Council) that was endowed with legislative powers. 101 The 
Council embarked on a number of reforms. Of particular relevance to this case were 
	
100 See, Daniel Eizenga, “Burkina Faso” in Africa Yearbook, Politics, Economy and Society South of the 
Sahara in 2015, Jon Abbink, Sebastian Elischer, Andreas Mehler, and Henning Melber eds., Volume 12, 
(2016: Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands), 53-63, pp. 53-54. 
101 See, Aljazeera News, “Burkina Faso appoints transitional government”, 23 November 2014, online: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/11/burkina-faso-appoints-transitional-government-
20141123225514740864.html  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3186627
	
amendments in respect of the electoral law which ousted particular persons who 
supported the past president from participation in the future electoral processes as 
ineligible either on the basis of any court decisions or conviction for electoral fraud.102 In 
addition, the Council introduced a new category of ineligible persons that includes:  
 
"all those who have supported unconstitutional change that undermines the 
principle of democratic alternation, including the principle of limiting the number 
of presidential terms that led to insurgency or any other form of uprising".103 
 
Daniel Eizenga describes the electoral law as the “most heated political reforms” 
undertaken by ‘Conseil National de la Transition’ (CNT or National Transition Council) 
– the transition’s legislative body.104  
 
Before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, the Applicants contended that the 
new law adopted by the Council violates their right to participate freely in elections in 
Burkina Faso and several international legal instruments that Burkina Faso is a signatory 
to.105  On its part, the State of Burkina Faso built its case on three grounds: that the 
ECOWAS Court is incompetent to entertain the action; that the Applicants’ motion is 
inadmissible; and that it was ill-founded.106  
 
First, with respect to the objection of incompetence, Burkina Faso argued that the 
ECOWAS Court was not seized of jurisdiction as the Applicants complaint was premised 
only on a possible, hypothetical or potential as opposed to concrete, actual or substantive 
violation of human rights being the category of infractions which the Court had in the 
past declared itself competent to handle.107 The ECOWAS Court, however, noted that it 
can legitimately adjudicate over violations that have not yet been carried out, but are 
imminent and may be fulfilled very soon.108 According to the ECOWAS Court,  
 
“The matter is therefore being referred to the Court urgently. In the present 
configuration, if it had to wait for applications to be eventually rejected before 
taking action, if it had to wait for the exhaustion of the effects of a transgression 
	
102 In this context, on 7 April 2015, the Council adopted Act No. 005-2015 that amended Act No. 014-
2001/AN of 3 July 2001 on the electoral code. In respect of ineligible persons, that is. those unable to stand 
for election, a new Section 135 added, in addition to the following provisions: Individuals deprived by 
judicial decision of their eligibility rights under the laws in force; Persons with legal advisers; and 
Individuals sentenced for electoral fraud. See, Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & Others 
v. The State of Burkina Faso, p. 3 
103 Ibid. 
104 Daniel Eizenga, “Burkina Faso”, supra note [*], p. 54. 
105 They relied on the following international and regional instruments: Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 21, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 26 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Articles 2 and 13, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; Articles 3.7, 3.11, 4.2, 8.1 and 10.3 of the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance; and Article 1(i) of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and 
Good Governance, 2001. 
106 See, Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & Others v. The State of Burkina Faso, par. 9, p. 
7 
107 See generally, Hissène Habré v. State of Senegal, [*] 
108 Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & Others v. The State of Burkina Faso, par. 16.  
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to be expressed in law, its jurisdiction in an emergency context would be 
meaningless, since the alleged victims of such violations would then find 
themselves inexorably aggrieved in the electoral competition.”109 
 
Further, the Court emphasized its previous position that in special circumstances “the risk 
of a future violation confers on an applicant the status of victim” and in such situations, 
there are “reasonable and convincing indications of the likelihood of actions” that might 
violate human rights”.110 The ECOWAS Court considered that the Applicants complaints 
feel in this category, hence, it dismissed the State of Burkina Faso’s argument that it 
lacked competence to rule on the matter since the complaint is still in abstract. 
Interestingly, the ECOWAS Court emphasized in Paragraph 19 of the judgment that, 
although it may lack the jurisdiction to adjudicate over electoral disputes in Member 
States, “it may be validly seized when it appears that the electoral process is marred by 
human rights violations, the punishment of which falls within its jurisdiction.”111 The 
Court’s assertion has broad implication where considered in the context of election 
protests and often times, brutalization and arrest that follow by police authorities.  
 
Second, on the question of inadmissibility of the appeal, the ECOWAS Court rejected 
this submission by the State of Burkina Faso. In its opinion, although it is only seized of 
jurisdiction over individuals and not political parties, particularly where the question of 
the right to participate in elections and in the management of public affairs are concerned, 
however, there is nothing that inherently prevents the Court from knowing about them 
because such a restriction may have the unintended consequence of harming political 
formation and participation in the management of public affairs. According to the 
ECOWAS Court,  
 
“Not only do the texts governing the Court not preclude legal persons from 
bringing cases before the Court, provided that they are nevertheless victims 
(Article 10 (d) of the 2005 Protocol), but it would be in a purely artificial and 
unreasonable way if the Court refused to grant political parties the right to bring 
cases before it if rights linked to their vocation as electoral competitors were 
infringed.”112 
 
Thirdly, the ECOWAS Court considered the principal substantive question: whether the 
amendment of Burkina Faso’s electoral law, given the was it is applied, violates the right 
to certain political parties and citizens to vote and participate in elections? Based on the 
jurisprudence of the Court and its governing laws, a number of principles emerge. First is 
that the ECOWAS Community Court does not adjudicate over any legal issues that are 
internal or arise from the national constitution of its Member States. The consequences of 
the first rule for the dispute before the Court were twofold: (i) “… any reference to 
national law, be it the Constitution of Burkina Faso or any kind of infra-constitutional 
	
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid. par, 17; also see, Hadidjatou Mani Koraou v. The Republic of Niger, [*] 
111 Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & Others v. The State of Burkina Faso, par. 19. 
112 Ibid, par. 20. 
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norms, must be removed from judicial debate.” 113  In this regard, references by the 
Applicant to the National Constitution and the Transition Charter of the State of Burkina 
Faso as inappropriate before the ECOWAS Community Court. Being an “international 
court, it is intended to penalize only the breach of obligations resulting from international 
instruments enforceable against [Member] States.”114 (ii) Given the ambiguity of the new 
Article 135 of the Electoral Code of Burkina Faso, the Court must resist any temptation 
to clarify or engage in the exegesis of the text or to orient its interpretation in any 
particular way.115 According to the ECOWAS Court,  
 
“its function is not to discover the intention of the national legislator, or to 
compete with national courts in their own field, which is precisely that of 
interpreting national texts. However, the Court regains jurisdiction once the 
interpretation or application of a national text has the object or effect of depriving 
citizens of rights derived from international instruments to which Burkina Faso is 
a party.”116 
 
In the opinion of the ECOWAS Community Court, there is no doubt that the exclusion of 
a number of political groups and citizens from the electoral competition that is being 
prepared constitutes discrimination which is difficult to justify in law. Although, in 
particular circumstances, a country's legislation may make it impossible for certain 
citizens to hold elective offices, such restriction of the right of access to public office 
must nonetheless be justified, in particular, by the commission of particularly serious 
offences. In particular, the court noted that: 
 
“If, therefore, the principle of constitutional and political autonomy of States 
clearly implies that States have the latitude to determine the regime and political 
institutions of their choice and to adopt the laws they wish, this freedom must be 
exercised in accordance with the commitments they have undertaken in this 
regard. There is no doubt that such undertakings exist, and the impressive list of 
texts invoked by the applicants amply attests to this. In the particular context of 
ECOWAS, reference should be made only to the following provisions of the 
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, concluded in 2001” 
 
The court held that the exclusion at issue in this case is neither legal nor necessary to 
stabilize the democratic order, contrary to the defendant's allegations. Indeed, the 
restriction imposed by the Electoral Code does not have the sole effect of preventing 
applicants from standing as candidates, it also significantly limits the choice offered to 
the electorate, and thus alters the competitive nature of the election. In its final analysis, 
the ECOWAS Court held that the political groups and Burkinabe citizens who could 
stand for election because of the amendment of the electoral law must be reinstated.  
 
	
113 Ibid, par 25. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. par. 26. 
116 Ibid. par 27. 
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Unlike the Nigerian case of Dr. Jerry Ugokwe discussed above, the Congrès pour la 
Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & others vs. The State of Burkina Faso illustrates 
circumstances where the ECOWAS Community Court has assumed jurisdiction on the 
mixed issues of potential human rights violation that arose of the political process for 
election. The case indeed expressly underscores the argument in this chapter that the 
ECOWAS Community Court is an alternative mobilization forum for opposition political 
parties or figures. In particular, it is evident from the background socio-political context 
that challenging the decision of the National Transition Council before the national courts 
would likely fail. However, the potential human rights violation lever provided an 
important strategy for the ECOWAS Community Court to assume jurisdiction and make 
pronouncements that not only impacts the human rights of the parties, but also, has 
implications for their capability to participate in elections in Burkina Faso. From this 
point of view, one appreciates the intricate nature of the normative role that cases 
otherwise couched as human rights violation actions are potential veil for broader 
political contestations of the litigants before the ECOWAS Community Court. 
 
Centre for Democracy and Development, and Center for Defence of Human Rights 
and Democracy vs. Mamadou Tandja, & The Republic of Niger 
 
Similar to many of the political cases that have been litigated before the ECOWAS Court, 
this case arose out of attempts by a sitting president to amend the constitution of the 
country in order to extend his tenure in office for a third term.117  The Applicants filed a 
complaint with the ECOWAS Court against Mr. Mamadou Tandja, then President of the 
Republic of Niger, and against the Republic of Niger for the violation of the human rights 
of the people of Niger to freely participate in the conduct of their affairs by the election 
of a new president in December 2009.  
 
As part of the preparations leading to the 2009 elections, a well-funded movement with 
the slogan “Tazartche” – translated “continuity” called for an extension of the mandate of 
Mr. Tandja beyond 2009. For over three months, the Nigerien civil society, trade unions, 
and opposition groups protested President Tandja’s attempts to change the constitution to 
extend his tenure beyond December 2009.118 In May 2009, the Constitutional Court of 
Niger declared that President Tandja’s attempt to remain in office after the end of his 
term was unconstitutional.119 Following this declaration, based on a presidential decree, 
President Tandja, dissolved the National Assembly which itself led to other proceedings 
before the national courts of Niger.120 The president carried on with the amendment of 
	
117 Centre for Democracy and Development, and Center for Defence of Human Rights and Democracy vs. 
Mamadou Tandja, & The Republic of Niger, Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/07/09; Judgement No. 
ECW/CCJ/JUD/05/11.  
118 For an account of events from May 2009 to August 2009, see, Global Nonviolent Action Database, 
“Niger Opposition groups protest President Tandja’s attempts to stay in power, 2009”, online: 
https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/niger-opposition-groups-protest-president-tandja-s-attempts-
stay-power-2009  
119 See, Mail & Guardian, “Niger leader moves to dissolve Constitutional Court”, 30 June 2009, online: 
https://mg.co.za/article/2009-06-30-niger-leader-moves-to-dissolve-constitutional-court; 
120  BBC News, “Niger leader dissolves parliament”, 26 May 2009, online: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8067831.stm  
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the constitution by inserting a new clause that removes any limitation on the presidential 
mandate.121 
 
Before the ECOWAS Community Court, the Applicants asked the Court for declarations 
that President Tandja’s decision to remain in power and to organize an illegal 
constitutional referendum as null and void; and that the violent suppression of protests as 
illegal and a violation of the human rights of the Nigerien people’s freedom of 
expression, assembly and association as guaranteed by Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the 
African Union’s, Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Applicants also 
sought orders prohibiting President Tandja from organizing a referendum; remaining in 
power beyond December 2009; and dispersing the protests against his plan to run for a 
third term. In Response, the Defendants, inter alia, raised preliminary objections of 
inadmissibility of the initiation of the proceedings, and also contest the facts presented 
and legal grounds relied upon by the applicants. In particular, they contended that the 
application is inadmissible because the Applicants are not entitled to act on behalf of the 
Nigerien people pursuant to a combined reading of the provisions of Article 10 of the 
ECOWAS Community Court Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 and Articles 5 and 6 of the Nigerien 
constitutions as the provision only anticipates persons as opposed to non-governmental 
organizations, who have been victims of a violation of human rights. They also 
contended that the ECOWAS Community Court cannot assess the violation of human 
rights in abstract or in speculation. In addition, they argued that, should the court find that 
it is competent to entertain the matter, it would be assuming jurisdiction over a matter 
that relates to the internal law of a Member State, contrary to its powers.  
 
First, with regard to jurisdiction of the Court, the ECOWAS Court noted that convening 
an electoral body for a referendum on the constitution of Niger Republic is an exercise of 
regulatory power in a sovereign Member State. Consequently, the court held that it is not 
competent to adjudicate the lawfulness or constitutionality of acts complained of or to 
prohibit the taking of such acts. Hence, it declared itself incompetent to prohibit President 
Tandja or the agents of the Republic of Niger from organizing the referendum in order to 
remain in power or to disperse the protest marches against the organization of the 
referendum. However, in relation to the complaints regarding the violation of human 
rights, the court held that it has jurisdiction to examine these complaints.  
 
Second, on the question of inadmissibility of the request on the ground that the 
Applicants are not entitled to act on behalf of the Nigerien people, the Court held that the 
Applicants have not demonstrated their capacity as victims nor have they been justified 
by standing to act on behalf of victims whose mandates they have received. The fact that 
both applicants are not registered non-governmental associations in Niger was important 
to the finding of lack of admissibility by the Court as they cannot be victims of the 
consequences of the actions that they have complained of.  
 
Third, the court was urged by the Defendant to declare the action moot as it had been 
overtaken by developments in Niger. The Applicants however responded with a very 
	
121  The Applicants argue that the actions of President were a violation of Articles 36 & 136 of the 
Constitution of Niger and Article 13(1) of the African Charter of Human Rights.  
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interesting argument that points to the overall argument in this chapter. According to 
them, they would maintain their claims on the ground that the ECOWAS Court’s decision 
would help dissuade other officials who intended to manipulate the constitutions of their 
country for a longer time {while they were?} in power.122  Although the court agreed 
with the Respondent that the orders would be devoid of purpose, the argument of the 
Applicants nevertheless demonstrates as argued in this chapter that the motivations of the 
actors before the ECOWAS Community Court in instituting these types of cases, that 





Valentine Ayika vs. Republic of Liberia 
 
The Plaintiff is this case was a Nigeria businessman who returned to the Republic of 
Liberia with an undeclared amount of United States Five Hundred and Eight Thousand, 
Two Hundred Dollars ($508,200) that was later confiscated based on an order of the 
Circuit Court of Liberia.123 Subsequent to the order of confiscation, between 2006 and 
2009, investigations were conducted into the source and the purpose of the money. By a 
letter dated 23rd January 2009, the Defendant’s Minister of Justice and Attorney-General 
wrote a letter to the Central Bank of Liberia confirming that the investigations had been 
concluded in favor of the Plaintiff and that the bank should release the money to him, less 
the penalty for non-declaration of the money. The letter was however withdrawn on the 
ground that it misrepresented the facts and that the Central Bank of Liberia was directed 
to continue to hold the money pending further investigations. Valentine instituted this 
action in pursuant of his right to property as guaranteed under the African Charter on 
Human and people’s Rights, the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, the Protocol of the 
Community Court of Justice and the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia. In 
particular, the Plaintiff sought a declaration that the confiscation of the sum of 
US$508,200,00 as proceeds of criminal conduct should be declared null and void; an 
order directing the release of the said sum with interests as well as the Plaintiff’s passport 
and costs against the Defendant. On its part, the Defendant contended that the 
investigation into the source and purpose of the funds had not been concluded as at the 
time the action was instituted and urged the court to dismiss the action.  
 
To determine whether the Plaintiff was entitled to the recover the confiscated sum, the 
ECOWAS Community Court considered the mode of transportation and declaration of 
the currency; the legality of the confiscation order; and the effect of the investigative 
reports by the Defendant’s agents. With respect to the first issue, the Court found that the 
Plaintiff did not declare the funds at the airport to any official of the Defendant. On the 
	
122 See, Paragraph 34, Centre for Democracy and Development, and Center for Defence of Human Rights 
and Democracy vs. Mamadou Tandja, & The Republic of Niger. 
123 See, Valentine Ayika vs. Republic of Liberia, Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/07/11; Judgment No. 
ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/12; also see, George J. Borteh, “West Africa: Ecowas’ Court Ruling Not Binding on 
Liberia – Supreme Court says in Ayika’s U.S.$508,200 Case, AllAfrica, 25 July 2013, online: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201307251585.html  
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second issue, legality of the confiscation order, it found that the “undisputed evidence 
before the court indicates that the plaintiff was not served with a notice to the hearing of 
the confiscation proceedings.”124 He was therefore not given the opportunity to be heard 
and therefore he therefore argued this offended “the letter and spirit of the cardinal 
confiscation proceedings.”125 However, as the proceedings was only interim and did not 
dismiss of the matter ad infinitum, “no prejudice resulted from it to the detriment of the 
plaintiff.”126 On the final question raised by the Court, the effect of the investigative 
reports by the Defendant’s agents, it found that the Defendant had over four years to 
investigate the matter before the Plaintiff commenced this action. In the Court’s opinion, 
that was a reasonable time to locate any evidence to support the charge against the 
Plaintiff. The fact that “the defendant has not been able to find evidence to support the 
charge … leads the court to the irresistible conclusion that the plaintiff is not indeed 
guilty of the charge preferred against him. The defendant therefore has no legal 
justification to withhold the plaintiff’s money.”127 Based on these outcomes, the Court 
ordered that ECOWAS Court ordered the release of the sum with interest to the Plaintiff.  
 
The socio-political ramifications of this case exceed exemplifies the limitations of an 
analysis that focuses strictly on the implementation of the decisions of the ECOWAS 
Community Court mega-political decisions. The ramifications reinforce the core 
argument of this chapter that the cases, their motivations and implementation should be 
understood as embedded in the complex social and political relations of the ECOWAS 
Member States and their national polity. The first point relates to the issue of compliance. 
Unlike, the Sambo Dasuki case considered next, the Republic of Liberia eventually 
complied with the order of the ECOWAS Community Court to return the sum 
confiscated from the Plaintiff. According to Newspaper Reports, “the Liberian 
Government was forced to cough up [United States Five Hundred Thousand dollars 
$500,000] it seized from a Nigerian Businessman, Chief Valentine Ayika, who was later 
elected Senator in Nigeria.” 128  Shortly after the decision was delivered, there were 
openings for the appointment of judges to the ECOWAS Court. Liberia planned to put 
forward some candidates. However, its non-recognition of the status of the Court’s 
decision arising out of Ayika’s case threatened the support of the Nigeria for Liberia’s 
candidates. The handling of the matter had reportedly impacted the socio-political 
relations between Liberia and the Nigeria as the later indicated it will not support the 
candidature of Liberian judges to the ECOWAS Court. 129  Although a Liberian was 
eventually appointed as a judge of the court,130 the same judge was later withdrawn based 
	
124 Ayika’s Case, p. 11 paragraph 27. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid, p. 16. 
128 Front Page Africa Editorial, “Disgrace Keeps Hoovering Over Liberia’s Judiciary Branch”, Online: 
http://www.frontpageafricaonline.com/index.php/editorial/3844-disgrace-keeps-hoovering-over-liberia-s-
judiciary-branch?fromNewsdog=1&utm_source=NewsDog&utm_medium=referral   
129 See, Rodney D. Sieh, “West Africa: ECOWAS Court Puts Liberia on Hold over U.S. $500K”, online: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201401151311.html  
130 See, Front Page Africa, “West Africa: Former Liberia Solicitor General Wilkins Wright Appointed to 
ECOWAS Court”, online: http://allafrica.com/stories/201406200889.html  
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on conflict of interest that arose from a case he presided over while at the Supreme Court 
of Liberia.131  
 
The tension Ayika’s case generated on the power of the ECOWAS Community Court to 
overrule a decision of the Supreme Court of Liberia heightens the debate on the 
supranational status of the ECOWAS Community Court. It is not clear what role the 
political stature of the Plaintiff or threat of breakdown in the diplomacy between Nigeria 
and Liberia played in the process. However, against an initial claim by the government of 
Liberia that it does not recognize ECOWAS Community Court’s binding powers, the 
subsequent compliance with the decision only reinforces the supranational status of the 
Court. I would elaborate on this point in the ensuing sections. 
 
VI. Themes Emerging from the Mega-Political Cases before the ECOWAS Court 
 
This section analyzes three (3) insights that emerge from the analyses of the mega-
political disputes before the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. Although the 
tendency is to disregard the political jurisprudence of the court, these themes illustrate the 
innovative ways that litigants strategically approach the Court. Litigants do not always 
go to the court because they necessarily are seeking compliance of their decisions. In 
other words, as the cases in this chapter shows, litigants who go to the ECOWAS Court 
of Justice are not wedded to the traditional roles of the judicial system as dispute settlers. 
On their part, the judges have also been very cautious in entertaining these disputes. 
While they have be resistant and emphatic that their jurisdiction does not extend to 
political cases, where such an action impacts on the fundamental rights of a citizen, the 
court has assumed jurisdiction. 132 Assuming jurisdiction in this regard accords with the 
practices of other international courts that accept jurisdiction even when a legal dispute 
comes embedded with political dispute. Further, in most cases, where a national court has 
dealt with a particular matter or indeed where it is still pending before a national court, in 
the absence of a denial of fair hearing, the ECOWAS Community Court has been vocal in 
affirming the validity of those decisions. This affirmation of the boundaries of their 
power plays a reverse role in strengthening the legitimacy of the ECOWAS Community 
Court. Similarly, it avoids projecting the perception that they are in competition with the 
national courts of the member states of the ECOWAS Community or indeed an appellate 
court. Furthermore, it reaffirms the supranational character of the court in relation to the 
areas that it has expressly been conferred jurisdiction. 
	
131 Following the suspension of his license by Liberia and recall from the ECOWAS Court where he was 
the vice-president, Mr. Wilkins Wright has instituted actions against Liberia, see, Lenart Dodoo, “Supreme 
Court of Liberia Nails ECOWAS Court Judge Wilkins Wright”, online: 
http://www.frontpageafricaonline.com/index.php/politics/3406-supreme-court-of-liberia-nails-ecowas-
court-judge-wilkins-wright; ______“Liberia Fails to File Defense in Wilkins Wright Alleged Rights 
Violation”, Front Page Africa News, online: http://www.frontpageafricaonline.com/index.php/news/4194-
liberia-fails-to-file-defense-in-wilkins-wright-alleged-rights-violation; Bettie K. Johnson Mbayo, 
“ECOWAS Court Calls Off Relationship Building Seminar in Liberia”, Front Page Africa Online: 
http://www.frontpageafricaonline.com/index.php/politics/3433-ecowas-court-calls-off-relationship-
building-seminar-in-liberia 
132 On the plausibility of a right to democratic governance, see, Nsongurua J. Udombana, “Articulating the 
Right to Democratic Governance in Africa”, (2003) 24 Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 1210-
1253. 
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Jurisdiction over Election Disputes by ECOWAS Court - Framing election disputes in 
human rights language 
 
The first insight that emerges from some of the analysis of the mega-political cases 
analyzed in this paper relates to the question of jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Community 
Court to entertain this unique type of disputes. The Plaintiffs are aware that the court 
lacks the jurisdiction to entertain these cases, however, to get what is in reality election 
dispute or unconstitutional amendment before the court, the litigants couch their claims in 
the language of potential or actual human rights violation. Based on this approach, while 
it is still left to the Respondent or Defendant challenge the jurisdiction of the court, the 
Plaintiff will at least have their day in court, even if the Court decides not to rule on the 
merits of the case.  
 
On may ask: how does this differ then from the human rights cases over which the 
ECOWAS Community Court has express jurisdiction? The answer to this question lies in 
large part in the motivations that bring the litigants before the Court in the first place. As 
the counsel in Hope Democratic Party’s case, asserted, most litigants want the 
opportunity for ECOWAS Community Court “to rule on [their disputes] so as to serve as 
a deterrent to other would-be violators of the elections law on fairness and equality before 
the law.” [Emphasis mine] While one is cautious not to over generalize, there is 
significant weight that must be given to the fact that the motivations of the litigants, 
outside actual or potential violation of human rights, provide the impetus for the 
innovative ways that they bring their claims before the ECOWAS Community Court. 
 
 
Reverse or embedded victory in lost cases or Instrumental Effects of the Cases 
 
The litigants before the court are motivated, not by the success of their action, but, 
because of the instrumental effect it has in pressuring the government of the concerned 
member state to act as a law-abiding member of the international community. This theme 
also derives from the motivations of the litigators of political disputes before the 
ECOWAS Community Court. This insight must however be preceded by some important 
points. In most cases, the political event that is the subject of litigation would have ended 
by the time that the decision of the community court is delivered. Hence, it would appear 
almost irrelevant and a waste of time and resources of the court to continue to deliver 
judgments in such situations. Second, the litigants have the choice to have instituted the 
action before the national court; however, for various reasons that include but are not 
limited to the possibility of executive interference or intimidation, corruption, and length 
of prosecution of the cases, they consider the ECOWAS Community Court as a 
preferable alternative forum. In many cases, a primary motivation for the pursuit of the 
majority of the disputes before the ECOWAS Community Court as, in part, a 
consequence of the lack of confidence in the fairness of the judicial processes in the 
domestic courts of the member states as well as the fact that there is no guarantee that the 
executive or party in power would not obstruct the process of justice through technical 
delays and deliberately slow it down and dismissed on technical grounds without 
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considering the substantive matter before the tribunal or court of law. Hence, judicial 
corruption, impartiality, and likely executive intimidation are implicated in the process 
that has given rise to political cases before the ECOWAS Community Court. 
 
While the foregoing traditional reasons are important, they do not capture other 
instrumental roles that provide the basis for the political disputes before the court. In this 
regard, the motivators are quick to use the media as a source of gathering significant 
awareness to the existence of the action before the court. Although this paper has not 
undertaken an empirical research into the extent to which such strategies has influenced 
the action of the governments, it is nonetheless an interesting point for future research. 
 
Incremental Enhancement of the supranational status of ECOWAS Court 
 
Unlike freedom of movement and human rights cases that have direct or indirect 
economic implications,133 these political cases are an important area of study particularly 
for their perceived attribute of challenging the sovereignty of the member states and the 
finality of the decisions of the national courts. Yet, the judges of the ECOWAS 
Community Court have been careful in the way that they handle these otherwise sensitive 
matters. To the extent that they have not been subjected to any backlash134 from the 
Member States, I contend that the action of the judges has in reverse incrementally 
enhanced their supranational status, at least, in relation to the areas that they have 
jurisdiction. 
 
Theoretical Claim: Re-conceptualizing ECOWAS and ECOWAS Court as a Social 
Phenomenon 
 
In addition to the other insights, a broader theoretical claim that reconceptualizes 
regionalism in ECOWAS and perhaps Africa as a social phenomenon emerges in from 
the analyses. The intrinsic nature of regional organizations and the courts they create 
remain a debate. Whereas some scholars have argued that the ECOWAS Community 
Court should be reconsidered as a human rights court or at least one that promotes human 
rights135 , others have simply referred to them generically as “trade-plus” regimes.136 
These varying descriptions of the fundamental nature of these organizations, while true, 
suggest a fragmentation and lack of coherence that may ultimately distract from the 
significance of the work they do, however modest. 
 
	
133 See, Laurence R. Helfer, “Sub-regional Courts in Africa: Litigating the Hybrid Right to Freedom of 
Movement”, 15 I-CON: International Journal of Constitutional Law (forthcoming), p. 6; available online: 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3517/   
134 Cite Gathii Backlash and similar pieces. 
135  Nneoma Nwogu, “Regional Integration as an Instrument of Human Rights: Reconceptualizing 
ECOWAS”, (2007) Volume 6 Issue 3, Journal of Human Rights, pp. 345-360; Nani Jansen Reventlow, 
“Strategic Litigation Before the African Regional Courts: Great Potential for Progressive Protection of 
Human Rights” Groningen Journal of International Law Blog, March 12, 2018, online: 
https://grojil.org/2018/03/12/strategic-litigation-before-the-african-regional-courts-great-potential-for-
progressive-protection-of-human-rights/;  
136 Gathii, supra note [*]. 
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Reconceptualizing ECOWAS and indeed regionalism in Africa as a social phenomenon 
that is embedded in unique and complex socio-political and economic contexts has two 
main advantages: first, it dispenses with the need to justify the changing focus of the 
organizations and the courts they establish as they reflect the complex national dynamics 
of the Member States at different times. Second, I argue that such broad approach provide 
an umbrella under which the non-contradictory varying descriptions can be sub-summed 
and explained as part of the uniqueness of the organizations and in a way that does not 





The aim in this paper has been a careful analysis of some of the mega-political disputes 
before the ECOWAS Community Court. Reimagining ECOWAS and ECOWAS 
Community Court as a social phenomenon that is embedded in the socio-political terrain 
of its Member States, I argued that the understanding of the implications of these cases 
must be widely situated in ways that are not wedded to the traditional notions of 
compliance and enforcement of judgements that are underpinned by formalist approaches 
to law. 
 
Some of the key insights that emerge from the analysis of the cases as analyzed in the 
preceding section demonstrates the unique nature of the political disputes before the 
ECOWAS Court. Indeed, understanding them only has the truest meaning when situated 
in the socio-political context from which they emerge. Similarly, any likely implications 
they may have, should be seen from such a perspective. All around Africa, election 
disputes are sensitive. 138  ECOWAS Community Court judges must therefore be 
commended for the candor with which they have adjudicated over these disputes without 
any known backlash to date. Yet, there remains significant room for the continuous study 
of this category of disputes before the court, particularly, in relation to the possibility of 
the expansion of the actors before to Court to include the political parties, who continue 
to be co-litigants with their individual representatives.  
	
137 Some of the contributions in his volume demonstrate the value of this approach. 
138  See, Edwin Odhiambo Abuya, “Can African States Conduct Free and Fair Presidential Elections”, 
(2010) Volume 8 Issue 2 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, pp. 122-164. 
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